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I. INTRODUCTION
I N South Africa, whites own about 87% of the country's agricultural
land, though they make up less than 2% of the population.1 The
dominant belief among South Africa's Black2 majority is that whites
obtained this property not through their hard work, but instead through
systematic land dispossession and other forms of unyielding oppression
that began at colonial conquest and intensified with Apartheid. There
are several other countries where past theft rather than hard work is
widely believed to explain the status quo of property ownership. Bo-
livia's indigenous majority-primarily the Aymara, Quechua, Chiquitano,
and Guarani peoples-constitutes about 62% of the total population. 3
Yet, the minority-the Europeans and mixed-race peoples-owns the
lion's share of the country's wealth. 4 In the minds of Bolivia's indigenous
majority, the present distribution of land is the result of colonial-era theft,
and is thus illegitimate. 5 In 1992, Russia embarked on a privatization
program that established the post-Communism status quo of property
ownership.6 This program was so riddled with corruption that a signifi-
1. Johan van Rooyen & Bongiwe Njobe-Mbuli, Access to land: selecting the benefi-
ciaries, in AGRICULTURAL LAND REFORM IN SOUTH AFRICA: POLICIES, MARKETS AND
MECHANISMS 461 (Johan van Zyl et al. eds., 1996) ("Land distribution in South Africa is
highly skewed. Approximately 87% of agricultural land is held by almost 67,000 white
farmers and accommodates a total population of 5.3 million. The remaining 71% of the
population, which is predominantly black, live on 13% of the land in high density areas-
the former homelands.").
2. When I refer to Blacks (with a capital "B") in the South African context, I am
talking about those classified as Coloureds, Indians, and Africans under Apartheid.
3. Indigenous groups constitute 56-70% of the population, and two-thirds of indige-
nous people, who are mostly subsistence farmers, live in poverty. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
BACKGROUND NOTE: BOLIVIA (Mar. 2007), http://www.state/gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35751.htm.
4. See Jose de Cordoba, Class Struggle: Along the Andes, Indians Agitate for Political
Gain; Radicals Topple Governments, Test U.S. Regional Policy; Rising Clout in Bolivia;
Longing for the Inca Empire WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 2004, at Al.
5. Land dispossession is one source of the indigenous people's recent unrest, which
vaulted Evo Morales to the presidency. Id.
6. See generally Andrei Baev, The Privatization of Land in Russia: Reforms and Im-
pediments, 17 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 9 (1994) (discussing the history of
Russian land privatization programs and existing land legislation and land reforms);
Merton Peck, Russian Privatization: What Basis Does it Provide for a Market Economy?, 5
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 22, 27 (1995) (noting the rapid pace of privatiza-
tion: "There were only thirty-nine private enterprises as of January 1992; by February 1994
there were about 93,000 such firms.").
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cant amount of state resources ended up in the hands of a few of Russia's
powerful oligarchs. 7 As a result, the status quo of property ownership in
Russia is widely perceived to be illegitimate. 8 These three examples are
merely the tip of the iceberg; history is rife with similar examples.
Despite the fact that in certain countries the majority of citizens believe
that the property status quo is illegitimate, 9 under the neoliberal para-
digm for economic development,10 property rights are nonetheless given
sanctity and enshrined in their constitutions because people have an in-
centive to work hard and produce if they know that the fruits of their
labor are secure and not subject to capricious takings.'1 The underlying
7. See AMY CHUA, WORLD ON FIRE: How EXPORTING FREE MARKET DEMOCRACY
BREEDS ETHNIC HATRED AND GLOBAL INSTABILITY 6 (2003); Virginie Coulloudon, Priva-
tization in Russia: Catalyst for the Elite, FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Fall 1998, at 43, 44
(noting that privatization in Russia was riddled with scandals and gave birth to an oligar-
chic regime.).
8. Hilary Appel, Voucher Privatisation in Russia: Structural Consequences and Mass
Response in the Second Period of Reform, 49 EUR.-AsIA STUD. 1433, 1441 (1997) ("A large
number of Russians today hold the privatisation process in extreme contempt."); id. at
1448 n.51 ("Gurkov's 1994 survey research reports that 47.7% of respondents in October
1994 thought that privatisation equalled a robbery of national property.")
9. An individual's understanding of the circumstances under which property was gen-
erally acquired will determine what her attitudes are with respect to the legitimacy of prop-
erty arrangements. If the prevailing perception is that, for the most part, people deserve to
be in possession of the property that they presently own because they worked hard for it or
inherited it from someone who did, then it is likely that the majority of citizens will be
amenable to significant protection of private property. For instance, in the United States,
the general understanding is that today people have not acquired their possessions through
theft. Although people do acknowledge that at many points in history the United States
usurped land from native peoples and others through illegal and immoral means, this has
not created a widely held perception among Americans that the status quo of property
ownership in the United States today is illegitimate because of past theft. This is in part
because the injustice happened to a group that is now a politically and economically
marginalized minority. Also, it happened so long ago that the majority views those who
own property today as having a nominal connection to the perpetrators of the past land
theft. This is not the case in a place like South Africa or Zimbabwe (particularly before the
2000 land crisis began), where the prevailing belief is that the present status quo of prop-
erty distribution is a direct result of Apartheid or colonial-era theft, rather than hard work.
10. See generally GERARD DUMENIL & DOMINIQUE LEVY, CAPITAL RESURGENT:
ROOTS OF THE NEOLIBERAL REVOLUTION (Derek Jeffers, trans., Harvard Univ. Press
2004); LESTER C. THUROw, THE FUTURE OF CAPITALISM: How TODAY'S ECONOMIC
FORCES SHAPE TOMORROW'S WORLD 1-5 (1996); John L. Campbell & Ove K. Pedersen,
Introduction to THE RISE OF NEOLIBERALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 1 (John L.
Campbell & Ove K. Pedersen eds., 2001). The equity and efficacy of neoliberal economic
policies has been vigorously debated in academic circles. For a conservative viewpoint, see
MELVIN J. THORNE, AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT SINCE WORLD WAR II: THE
CORE IDEAS 114-116 (Contributions in Political Science Series No. 251, Bernard K.
Johnpoll ed., 1990) (discussing the importance of private property rights to individual lib-
erty); for a liberal viewpoint, see Barry K. Gills, Democratizing Globalization and Global-
izing Democracy, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI., May 2002, at 158, 167 (noting that
the "neoliberal discourse has emphasized a Hayekian understanding of freedom as free-
dom above all for capital, for the movement of commodities, and for markets, that is, a
freedom for the holders of PROPERTY to pursue maximum flexibility and profit"). See gen-
erally NOAM CHOMSKY, PROFIT OVER PEOPLE: NEOLIBERALISM AND GLOBAL ORDER 32
(1999).
11. Most notably, this is an idea espoused and defended by Jeremy Bentham. Ben-
tham believed security of property is essential in maximizing social utility. See JEREMY
BENTHAM, Principles of the Civil Code, in THEORY OF LEGISLATION 110 (Etienne Dumont
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assumption behind the sanctity given to property is the notion of desert:
People generally deserve what they own because they labored for it or
received it through the hard work of someone else who bequeathed that
property as a gift or in a will. The "sanctity of property" principle be-
comes obfuscated when sanctuary is given to property arrangements
widely perceived to be defined by pervasive theft. In such cases, the prin-
ciple merely serves to ossify ill-gotten gains.
It is an injustice when the law provides sanctuary to past theft instead
of reversing it. More importantly, this injustice can lead to disrespect for
property rights, which can substantially disrupt market economies. Nev-
ertheless, the neoliberal solution for developing successful, stable mar-
kets is to deregulate trade and markets, reduce restrictions on capital,
reduce government spending, and privatize government enterprises. In
the effort to promote stable, successful markets, the neoliberal agenda
often discounts the importance of transforming, and thus legitimizing, the
property status quo. 12
Transforming the property status quo is especially necessary when an
ethnically distinct minority acquired significant amounts of property
through some form of past theft and today continues to enjoy the benefits
of their illicit or immoral act at the expense of the majority. At the very
least, the majority would resist strong property rights that ossified these
illicit gains; at worst, they would be more inclined to capricious and arbi-
trary takings of land, as witnessed in Zimbabwe beginning in 2000.13
In her book, World on Fire, Amy Chua argues that the calamitous situ-
ation in Zimbabwe, and other similarly situated nations, is caused by the
fact that
ed., R. Hildreth trans., London, Trubner & Co. 4th ed. 1882) (1843) ("Law does not say to
man, Labour, and I will reward you; but it says: Labour, and I will assure to you the enjoy-
ment of the fruits of your labour-that natural and sufficient recompense which without me
you cannot preserve; I will insure it by arresting the hand which may seek to ravish it from
you. If industry creates, it is law which preserves; if at the first moment we owe all to
labour, at the second moment, and at every other, we are indebted for everything to law.")
(emphasis original). For a critique of Bentham, see Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Ret-
roactive Legislation, 61 TEX. L. REV. 425, 473 (1982) (arguing that Bentham "exaggerates
the need to uphold existing expectations" with regard to property arrangements).
12. Geoffrey E. Schneider, Neoliberalism and Economic Justice in South Africa: Revi-
siting the Debate on Economic Apartheid, 61 REV. Soc. ECON. 23, 25 (2003) (arguing that
neoliberal economists have a "penchant to ignore the problems created by inequality and
their pursuit of narrowly defined economic goals and criteria," causing them to "abstract
from reality and ignore the economic benefits that could stem from developing an econ-
omy from the bottom up."). If the property status quo is successfully transformed and
chaos averted, an ancillary effect of this project will be to buttress the economic system-
neoliberalism. Inasmuch as neoliberalism systematically concentrates economic and deci-
sion-making power in an elite group, this is a temporary evil. The larger, long-term project
is to enhance democracy by democratizing decision-making power to the greatest extent.
Invisible people, however, do not have the power to overcome economic forces that tend
to undermine the devolution of decision-making power, whereas visible people do. Re-
versing invisibility and creating an empowered citizenry is a necessary first step in the long-
term project to create an economic system that does not systematically favor the elite.
13. See generally DONALD S. MOORE, SUFFERING FOR TERRITORY: RACE, PLACE,
AND POWER IN ZIMBABWE (2005).
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[m]arkets concentrate wealth, often spectacular wealth, in the hands
of the market-dominant minority, while democracy increases the po-
litical power of the impoverished majority. In these circumstances
the pursuit of free market democracy becomes an engine of poten-
tially catastrophic ethnonationalism, pitting a frustrated "indige-
nous" majority, easily aroused by opportunistic vote-seeking
politicians, against a resented, wealthy ethnic minority. 14
She argues that this volatile dynamic of inequality produces social in-
stability in the form of a backlash against market-dominant minorities,
democracy, and markets. 15 To avoid a backlash, I argue that states with
this dynamic must change the actual distribution of property. Countries
can achieve this end through various means.
There are several countries that have decided to change the property
status quo by restoring past rights in property. This has happened post-
communism in countries such as Germany, Czech Republic, Slovakia,
Hungary, Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, and Romania;
post-World War II in the former Federal Republic of Germany; post-
Apartheid in South Africa; and post-conflict in Kosovo. Native people in
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States have also re-
ceived compensation for property that was improperly confiscated in the
past. This Article will explore two important questions facing countries
that decide to restore past rights in property: Who, at a minimum, should
receive restoration of property rights, and how should the restorative pro-
cess transpire?
Part II explores who, at a minimum, should receive restoration of prop-
erty rights. I argue that, under certain circumstances, confiscating prop-
erty removes people from the social contract and renders them invisible.
I call this property-induced invisibility. Widespread property-induced in-
visibility is of particular concern because it can place the legitimacy of
existing property arrangements in serious doubt. As a baseline, there-
fore, states must rectify property-induced invisibility in the restorative
process. 16
14. CHUA, supra note 7, at 6. See also Amy Chua, The Paradox of Free Market De-
mocracy: Rethinking Development Policy, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 287, 287-92 (2000); Amy
Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Develop-
ment, 108 YALE L.J. 1, 6 (1998); Amy Chua, The Privatization-Nationalization Cycle: The
Link Between Markets and Ethnicity in Developing Countries, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 226
(1995). Also, it is important to note that Chua recognizes that the introduction of democ-
racy does not necessarily mean that the majority will gain any significant political power
because the will of the majority is still often subordinated via vote rigging and corruption
of various hues. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for
Law and Development, supra, at 56.
15. CHUA, supra note 7, at 6.
16. There is property-induced invisibility, which results from the dispossession of one's
property, and invisibility that occurs through other means, such as torture, incarceration,
loss of employment, loss of educational opportunity, etc. Restoration and redistribution,
which is not based primarily upon returning a lost right in property, must be implemented
in tandem to address the needs of both populations simultaneously. See infra Part II and
accompanying discussion of invisibility.
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Part III investigates how the restorative process can address property-
induced invisibility. I argue that societies must change the focus from the
limited concept of reparations-return of the actual property confis-
cated-to restoration, which is the larger project of restoring a dispos-
sessed group or individual's relationship to society. 17 In the context of
property-induced invisibility, the confiscation of property is part of a
larger strategy of dehumanization, resulting in the removal of that person
or community from the social contract. The consequence is more than
just the taking of real property, but also the destruction of their relation-
ship to society. Hence, the restorative process must do more than just
give people their property back; its aim must be to repair this relationship
to society (that is, restore political and economic visibility). I argue that a
substantial amount of work towards restoring a relationship to society
and correcting property-induced invisibility will occur if the dispossessed
are included in the social contract through a bottom-up process that pro-
vides asset-based choices, which both allow people to choose how they
are made whole and give them viable options from which to choose. 18
Lastly, in Part IV, I evaluate South Africa's Land Restitution Program
("LRP") to test the theoretical concepts of property-induced invisibility
and restoration that I have constructed. More specifically, I investigate
whether, as a baseline, South Africans subject to property-induced invisi-
bility benefit from the LRP. I also analyze how the government can
transform the LRP from a reparations program to a restoration program.
For the purposes of this Article, legitimacy is construed in both empiri-
cal and moral terms. Empirically, legitimacy is determined by the num-
ber of citizens who believe that land arrangements are legitimate. 19
Under the Weberian view, legitimacy "is meant to designate the beliefs
and attitudes that members have toward the society they make up. The
society has legitimacy when members so understand and value it that they
are willing to assume the disciplines and burdens which membership en-
tails. Legitimacy declines when this willingness flags or fails." 20
17. The following definitions will be used throughout the Article: Compensation-
generic term for any action taken to remedy a violation of a right, specifically a right in
property; Monetary compensation-money is given to remedy the harm; Restitution-
compensation is the return of the exact property taken or property that is similar; Repara-
tions-compensation for the loss of a past right, which does not allow the dispossessed
person to take an active role in shaping her remedy.
18. The legislature can construct a broad set of choices that make sense given the
historical, political, economic, and social context of the country and the nature of the ex-
propriations. The remedies may include restoration of property and cash or in-kind pay-
ments. The in-kind payments can entail, inter alia, the establishment of a trust fund that
can be used for education and health expenses, a voucher to purchase any government
services or properties, or preferential access to credit. See infra Part III and accompanying
text.
19. A. John Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy, 109 ETHics 739, 748 (1999).
20. Charles Taylor, Alternative Futures: Legitimacy, Identity, and Alienation in Late
Twentieth Century Canada, in COMMUNITARIANISM: A NEW PUBLIC ETHics 58 (Markale
Daly ed., 1994). See also JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEGISLATION xiv (Oceana
Publications 1975) ("Bentham grasps, thus, that public opinion is an important supportive
structure both for the legitimacy of the law (as well as the legal system) and for its effective
1424 [Vol. 60
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When evaluating the legitimacy of property arrangements, I will use the
same empirical approach adopted by Weber. Property arrangements are
considered legitimate as long as a substantial portion of society believes
so and is willing to respect and accept the disciplines and burdens of
maintaining the property status quo.2 1 To protect minorities, this empiri-
cal approach will be supplemented with a moral understanding of legiti-
macy, which considers actions that contravene a person or community's
fundamental human rights as necessarily illegitimate. 22
II. INVISIBILITY
A. PROPERTY CONFISCATION CAN REMOVE INDIVIDUALS AND
COMMUNITIES FROM THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND RENDER
THEM INVISIBLE
Aside from actual execution, being rendered invisible is the worst thing
that can happen to an individual or community because invisibility is a
type of social death. If citizenship is defined as "membership in a politi-
cal community, '23 invisible people are either completely excluded from
citizenship or are, in effect, sub-citizens. They are politically or economi-
cally powerless populations and hence the state can gaze past their diaph-
anous needs with nominal immediate consequence. Although invisible
people live physically within a society, they are not fully part of it. They
are not given space at the core of the polity as full members treated with
dignity; rather, they are relegated to the periphery where their humanity
is denied, and they vanish from the political eye in a haze of otherness.
implementation"). Legitimacy can be based on perceptions. See Simmons, supra note 19,
at 749. In contrast, it can be based on rights derived from either written documents (for
example, a constitution) or unwritten conceptions of morality. There is substantial litera-
ture in psychology and political science about legitimacy. For a thorough literature review
of legitimacy as discussed in psychology, see Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on
Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 375 (2006) ("[L]egitimacy is a
psychological property of an authority, institution, or social arrangement that leads those
connected to it to believe that it is appropriate, proper, and jusL Because of legitimacy,
people feel that they ought to defer to decision and rules, following them voluntarily out of
obligation rather than out of fear of punishment or anticipation of reward. Being legiti-
mate is important to the success of authorities, institutions, and institutional arrangements
since it is difficult to exert influence over others based solely upon the possession and use
of power."). For a thorough literature review of legitimacy as discussed in political institu-
tions, see James L. Gibson et al., Why Do People Accept Public Policies They Oppose?
Testing Legitimacy Theory with a Survey-Based Experiment, 58 POL. RES. Q. 187, 187
(2005).
21. A. Taylor, supra note 20, at 58.
22. Weber's conception of legitimacy is most vulnerable when the majority of a soci-
ety's citizens are manipulated by a demagogue and, in their mob mentality, goaded to
engage in morally abhorrent activities. Weber died in 1920 and did not live through World
War 11 to witness how Hitler and the Nazis manipulated the fears of many Eastern Europe-
ans and provided the average citizen to hate and kill millions of Jews, Roma, and Sinti.
Post-World War II, it is painfully obvious that a purely empirical definition of legitimacy is
inadequate.
23. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1471,
1486 (1986) (discussing citizenship).
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The use of invisibility as a metaphor for a person's political place in
society is not new. This Article echoes many of the characteristics of in-
visibility developed by legal scholars who have written about the plight of
blacks,24 Latinos, 25 gays,26 and women.27 The metaphor is often used as a
conduit to explore concepts such as exclusion, subjugation, identity sup-
pression, assimilation, nominal political representation, and, as in the case
of gays, lack of physical recognizability.
The metaphor of invisibility gained widespread recognition in 1952
with the publication of Ralph Ellison's classic novel, Invisible Man.28 In
the novel, invisibility is a symptom of a societal disease in which the
24. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, A Case For Race-Consciousness, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
1060, 1070 (1991) ("Blacks are 'invisible' not in the sense that whites do not see them; they
are 'INVISIBLE' in the sense that whites see primarily what a white dominant culture has
trained them to see."); D. Marvin Jones, "We're All Stuck Here For A While": Law and the
Social Construction of the Black Male, 24 J. CONTEMP. L. 35, 52-54 (1998) (arguing that
black men are unable to separate themselves from white perceptions and stereotypes of
who they are as a group and that deeply embedded stereotypes and myths about black men
have eclipsed their true identity and caused their invisibility).
25. See Christopher Cameron, How the Garcia Cousins Lost Their Accents: Under-
standing the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as the Product
of Racial Dualism, Latino Invisibility, and Legal Indeterminacy, 85 CAL. L. REV. 1347,
1354, 1358 (1997) (arguing that a lack of legal recognition for national origin discrimination
under Title VII is due to Latino's exclusion from the black-white, "bifurcated universe" of
racial discourse in the United States: "Racial dualism is problematic not only because it
limits judges' understanding of national origin claims, but also because it makes Latinos
and their problems in the workplace invisible."); Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the
Making of Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 965, 966 (1995) (arguing that Latino invisi-
bility is created by an "absence of public recognition and portrayal . . . prohibitions on the
use of Spanish ... [and] through the attribution of foreigness, [which the author termed]
symbolic deportation"').
26. Mark Chekola, Equality Foundation v. City of Cincinnati: Invisibility and Iden-
tifiability of Oppressed Groups, 6 LAW & SEXUALITY 141, 143-44 (1996) (suggesting that
homosexual invisibility is brought on by the fact that gays are not physically recognizable,
which explains the Sixth Circuit's reasoning in the case for holding that homosexuals are
not an identifiable class); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Closet Case": Boy Scouts of
America v. Dale and the Reinforcement of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender Invisi-
bility, 76 TUL. L. REV. 81, 110 (2001) (arguing gays are rendered invisible by the courts
because they fail to "recognize the expressive components of sexual identity"); Kenji
Yoshino, Assimilationist Bias in Equal Protection: The Visibility Presumption and the Case
of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell", 108 YALE L.J. 485, 487, 490 (1998) (arguing that courts en-
courage homosexual invisibility through equal protection heightened scrutiny).
Two commonalities emphasized by the courts are that race and sex ostensibly mark indi-
viduals with immutable and visible traits. A classification will therefore be less likely to
receive heightened scrutiny if its defining traits can be altered or concealed. By withhold-
ing protection from these classifications, the judiciary is subtly encouraging groups com-
prised by such classifications to assimilate by changing or hiding their defining
characteristic. See Yoshino, supra, at 487, 490.
27. See generally BREAKING OUT OF INVISIBILITY: WOMEN IN INDIAN HISTORY
(Aparna Basu & Anup Taneja eds., 2002); Berta Esperanza Hernadez-Truyol, Sex, Culture,
and Rights: A Reconceptualization of Violence for the Twenty-First Century, 60 ALB. L.
REV. 607, 616 (1997) (using invisibility to describe the lack of female representation in
organizational bodies involved in decision making and rights defining); Patricia McLean &
Marion Kostanski, Factors that Protect Women from Becoming 'Invisible', 55 AUSTL. J.
PSYCHOL. 197, 197 (2003); Carolyn Whitzman, At the Intersection of Invisibilities: Cana-
dian Women, Homelessness and Health Outside the 'Big City', 13 GENDER, PLACE & CUL-
TURE: J. FEMINIST GEOGRAPHY 383, 383-84 (2006).
28. See generally RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN (1947).
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plight of blacks is relegated to obscurity and societal institutions system-
atically deny black people's humanity. Invisibility is caused by the on-
looker's blindness rather than the protagonist's lack of substance or
translucent humanity. "I am invisible, understand, simply because people
refuse to see me.... When they approach me they see only my surround-
ings, themselves, or figments of their imagination-indeed, everything
and anything except me."'2 9
In his book, Slavery and Social Death, Orlando Patterson further devel-
ops the idea of invisibility with his concept of social death.30 Patterson
argues that a socially dead person has no recognizable being outside of
that given to her by, or derived from, her powerful master.31 A socially
dead person does not exist in society in her own right because the reign-
ing social compact includes her only as a sub-person, if it includes her at
all.
Like Ellison and Patterson, my conception of invisibility is predicated
upon a person's dehumanization and exclusion from society. Invisibility
results when the terms of the social contract are set or reordered such
that individuals or communities are dehumanized and excluded from the
contract. Invisible people are those who are denied their basic humanity
by the state, or other prevailing power structures, and excluded from the
polity; invisibility is a term that describes their consequent relationship to
that state. My definition of invisibility is centered upon the social con-
tract, because this is an effective tool to explain the moral and political
obligations between individuals and the state: the social contract sets the
terms of people's relationship to the state. 32
The body of literature that discusses the conditions under which indi-
viduals and communities are made invisible through their dehumaniza-
tion and exclusion from the social contract includes the diverse and
enlightening insights of John Locke, Carole Pateman, and Charles Mills.
29. Id. at 3.
30. See generally ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARA-
TIVE STUDY (1982).
31. Id. at 1 ("[A]II human relationships are structured and defined by the relative
power of the interacting persons."). A socially dead person is powerless and has "no so-
cially recognizable existence outside of his [powerful] master." Id. at 4-5.
32. In democracies, the terms are set by a constitution or other federal and local laws
as well as informal or customary laws. For more on how the social contract establishes
moral and political obligations between the state and individuals, see, for example, P.F.
Brownsey, Hume and the Social Contract, 28 PHIL. Q. 132, 132 (1978) ("While the details of
the social contract varied from theorist to theorist, it was common to all forms of social
contract theory that no one has rightful political authority and no one is morally obliged to
yield political obedience except in consequence of a social contract."); Edward A. Harris,
Note, From Social Contract to Hypothetical Agreement: Consent and the Obligation to
Obey the Law, 92 Colum. L. Rev. 651, 657 (1992) ("Social contract theory appeals to the
principle of rational voluntarism in explaining the origin of moral and political obligations,
and to the principle of consent in explaining how the autonomous individual voluntarily
relinquishes her natural liberty to the state, thereby incurring moral and political obliga-
tions."). Many scholars also question whether the social contract is the source of moral
and political obligation. See, e.g., A. JOHN SIMMONS, MORAL PRINCIPLES AND POLITICAL




Their work provides the foundation for my understanding of the circum-
stances under which a relationship between the state and an individual
breaks down, such that a person or community is taken out of the social
contract and made invisible.
According to Locke, in the state of nature, all individuals are equal and
"much better that they are not bound to submit to the unjust will of an-
other. '33 When an aggressor threatens to take away an individual's life,
liberty, or estate (that is, their Property), 34 that individual has the right to
resort to violence in self-defense. 35 Consequently, a state of war ensues
and is fueled by the need for every person to constantly and individually
defend their Property against interlopers and thieves. To avoid this ca-
lamitous fate and to secure protection of their Property, people ceded
their individual God-given sovereignty and vested it in the state as fiduci-
ary.36 For Locke, this bargained-for exchange is the essence of the social
contract.
37
An individual's consent to be part of a particular society is a binding
obligation that forbids him from returning to the state of nature, unless
the government is dissolved or an unjust state action terminates his par-
ticipation in the contract.38 The state was given its sovereignty in a fiduci-
ary capacity, and if the state fails to fulfill its fiduciary duties, then
sovereignty is returned to its source-the people. Since the protection of
Property is the central reason for entering into a social contract in the
first place, the systematic and arbitrary confiscation of Property by the
state is one of the primary reasons that an individual would be removed
33. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 276 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690). Locke's state of nature explanation of moral obligation to the
state is still relevant because
State-of-nature explanations of the political realm are fundamental potential
explanations of this realm and pack explanatory punch and illumination,
even if incorrect. We learn much by seeing how the state could have arisen,
even if it didn't arise that way. If it didn't arise that way, we also would learn
much by determining why it didn't; by trying to explain why the particular bit
of real world that diverges from the state-of-nature model is as it is.
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 8-9 (1974) (emphasis in original).
34. LOCKE, supra note 33, at 368. Life, liberty and estates are what Locke defines as
property, and this is what I mean when I use the capitalized term "Property" in this portion
of the article discussing Locke. When I use the un-capitalized term "property" throughout
the article, it refers to real property. I limit the discussion in this Article to the confiscation
of real property and do not include other types of property, including cultural, intellectual,
or property in one's person.
35. Id. at 308-09.
36. Id. at 368-69 ("The great and chief end therefore, of Mens uniting into Common-
wealths, and putting themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property.
To which in the state of Nature there are many things wanting.") (emphasis in original).
37. Id.; but cf BENTHAM, supra note 11, at 72-74, 81-82 (discussing Locke's social
contract theory).
38. LOCKE, supra note 33, at 367 ("Whereas he, that has once, by actual Agreement,
and any express Declaration given his Consent to be of any Commonweal, is perpetually
and indispensably obliged to be and remain unalterably a Subject to it, and can never be
again in the liberty of the state of Nature; unless by any Calamity, the Government, he was
under, comes to be dissolved; or else by some publick Act cuts him off from being any
longer a Member of it." ) (emphasis in original).
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from the social contract and once again become sovereign in her own
right. 39 This is especially true when the arbitrary confiscation leads to the
individual's total dependence on the state, such that she is in the state's
absolute power.40 At this point, individuals have a right to revolution
which those who are still in the social contract do not have.
Carole Pateman and Charles Mills give another perspective on how
people are excluded from the social contract. Their concept of exclusion
is more extensive than Locke's, in that it describes how some people are
never initially included, or are included but relegated to a subordinate
position, in the social contract. Also, while Locke's analysis is at the level
of the individual, Pateman and Mills analyze how groups are excluded
from the social contract.41
In her groundbreaking book The Sexual Contract, Pateman argues that
alongside the social contract exists a concomitant sexual contract. 42 The
sexual contract ensures and solidifies men's political right over women. 43
She argues that while social contracts are supposed to enhance and secure
freedom,44 this freedom is reserved for certain classes of individuals, ex-
cluding women.45 Pateman claims that contracts are one of the most im-
portant ways social relationships are formed, and women are
subordinated in these relationships due to social fictions surrounding who
39. Celeste Friend, Social Contract Theory [Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy]
(2001), http://www.iep.utm.edu/s/soc-cont.htm ("[T]he justification of the authority of the
executive component of government is the protection of the people's property and well-
being, so when such protection is no longer present, or when the king becomes a tyrant and
acts against the interests of the people, they have a right, if not an outright obligation, to
resist his authority. The social compact can be dissolved and the process to create political
society begun anew.").
40. LOCKE, supra note 33, at 297 (emphasis original) ("[H]e who attempts to get an-
other Man into his Absolute Power, does thereby put himself into a State of War with him;
It being to be understood as a Declaration of a Design upon his Life.").
41. Locke bases his justification for private ownership on the individual. See Christo-
pher Berry, Property and Possession: Two Replies to Locke-Hume and Hegel, in NoMos
XXII: PROPERTY 89 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) ("The most dis-
tinctive element in Locke's theory of property in his two Treatises of Government is his
justification of private ownership in purely individual terms.").
42. See CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACr 1-3 (1988). See also Friend, supra
note 39 (citing Pateman) ("[T]he 'original pact' that precedes the social contract entered
into by equals is the agreement by men to dominate and control women. This 'original
pact' is made by brothers, literally or metaphorically, who, after overthrowing the rule of
the father, then agree to share their domination of the women who were previously under
the exclusive control of one man, the father. The change from 'classical patriarchalism' to
modern patriarchy is a shift, then, in who has power over women. It is not, however, a
fundamental change in whether women are dominated by men. Men's relationships of
power to one another change, but women's relationship to men's power does not. Modern
patriarchy is characterized by a contractual relationship between men, and part of that
contract involves power over women.").
43. PATEMAN, supra note 42, at 2 ("The social contract is a story of freedom; the sex-
ual contract is a story of subjection. The original contract constitutes both freedom and
domination. Men's freedom and women's subjection are created through the original con-
tract-and the character of civil freedom cannot be understood without the missing half of
the story that reveals how men's patriarchal right over women is established through
contract.").
44. Id. at 62.
45. Id. at 5.
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has the capacity to enter into contracts. 46
The imaginations of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and other social
contract theorists were arrested by the prevailing myths of female inferi-
ority that reigned unchallenged in their respective time periods. One fac-
tor that harmonizes the writings of these men is the transformation of
social or anatomical differences between women and men into political
differences. 47 Thus, women were perceived as not being full-fledged per-
sons who possessed the mental acumen necessary to enter into the social
contract on the same terms as their male counterparts. 48 This variant of
dehumanization led to their exclusion from society as full and equal
members.
Charles Mills also makes an important contribution to the body of liter-
ature on social contract theory that examines the politics of dehumaniza-
tion and exclusion. In his influential book, The Racial Contract, he builds
upon Pateman's work on gender to elicit the role of social contract in
racial subordination. 49 The racial contract is intended to be an actual his-
torical account of the origins of racial oppression and white supremacy
rather than a political metaphor.50 Mills argues that the racial contract
underwrites the social contract and ensures that non-whites are excluded
or marginalized. 51
One fundamental premise of contract theory is that all men are born
free and live as such in the state of nature. Mills argues that European
powers considered non-white people to be savages born "unfree and une-
qual. '' 52 This subordinate ontological status was then legally codified and
perpetuated by both individuals and institutions. Despite the strands of
enlightened thought and egalitarianism that pervaded Europe at different
points in history, Mills posits that "European humanism usually meant
that only Europeans were human . . . [and] nonwhite subpersonhood is
enshrined simultaneously with white personhood.'' 53 Like Pateman, Mills
46. Id.
47. Id. at 6.
48. In the work of Hobbes, women are excluded from becoming civil individuals with
the capacity to enter into the original pact. Id. at 50. For Locke, women have not risen to
the status of individual in the State of Nature, and only individuals can enter into the social
contract. Id. at 52. Pateman highlights, however, that women's capacity with regard to
entering into the marriage contract was never questioned. Id. "Women are held both to
possess and to lack the capacities required for contract-and contract demands that their
womanhood be both denied and affirmed." Id. at 60.
49. See generally CHARLES W. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACr (1997).
50. Id. at 18-19. The social contract story recounted by Hobbes, Locke and other
philosophers is a political fiction and thus does not explain the actual and historical origins
of society. Id. at 19. Although the sexual contract explains actual conditions, it does not
give an historical exposition of how things come to be. Id.
51. Id. at 72-73.
52. Id. at 16 (emphasis in original).
53. Id. at 27, 56 (emphasis in original).
In philosophy one could trace this common thread through Locke's specula-
tions on the incapacities of primitive minds, David Hume's denial that any
other race but whites had created worthwhile civilizations, Kant's thoughts
on the rationality differentials between blacks and whites, Voltaire's polyge-
netic conclusion that blacks were a distinct and less able species, John Stuart
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argues that when certain people are considered sub-persons, this concep-
tual dehumanization becomes the yeast in the leaven bread of oppression
and exclusion.5 4
In sum, Locke, Pateman, and Mills lay the groundwork for a robust
understanding of how people are excluded from the social contract and
thus made invisible. Both Pateman and Mills stress the fact that exclu-
sion, or lack of initial inclusion, from the social contract is premised upon
the idea that those excluded are not full persons. In a Lockean analysis,
when the state systematically and arbitrarily deprives a person of life, lib-
erty, or estate and places an individual in its absolute power, creating a
situation of dependency, then the individual has effectively been removed
from the social contract and returned to the State of Nature, where the
state no longer has any legitimate authority over him.5 5
While I realize that invisibility is a broad concept that can result from,
inter alia, confiscation of property, severe restrictions on liberty, disap-
pearance, incarceration, torture, loss of employment, educational disrup-
tion, psychological scars, and sexual violence, in this Article, I
concentrate on the property-related avenues to invisibility. 56 Using the
work of Locke, Pateman, and Mills, I have constructed a definition of
property-induced invisibility that enumerates the circumstances in which
real property is confiscated from individuals or communities based on the
understanding that they are subhuman, 57 and as such, victims are ex-
cluded from the social contract and therefore become invisible. Property-
induced invisibility is the confiscation or destruction of real property with
no payment of just compensation, executed such that dehumanization oc-
curs. The act is perpetrated by the state or other prevailing power struc-
ture(s) and adversely affects powerless people or people made powerless
Mill's judgment that those races 'in their nonage' were fit only for
"despotism."
Id. at 59-60.
54. Friend, supra note 39 ("This racial contract determines in the first place who
counts as full moral and political persons, and therefore sets the parameters of who can
'contract in' to the freedom and equality that the social contract promises. Some persons,
in particular white men, are full persons according to the racial contract. As such they are
accorded the right to enter into the social contract, and into particular legal contracts.
They are seen as fully human and therefore as deserving of equality and freedom. Their
status as full persons accords them greater social power. In particular, it accords them the
power to make contracts, to be the subjects of the contract, whereas other persons are
denied such privilege and are relegated to the status of objects of contracts.").
55. LoCKE, supra note 33, at 350-51.
56. Invisibility and property-induced invisibility are highly interrelated concepts.
Property confiscation can cause invisibility or, alternatively, property confiscation can be a
consequence of the fact that people were made invisible through other means.
57. In the language of Carol Rose, the nature of the property disruption I speak of can
be classified as a "Type III disruption." Carol Rose, Property and Expropriation: Themes
and Variations in American Law, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 1, 6 ("Type III disruptions are what I
will call 'extraordinary.' These are the rights alterations that accompany revolutions and
warfare or other upheavals that create massive overthrowings of existing property rights
and resource uses."). This is in contrast to property disruptions classified as Type I and




by the act, such that they are effectively left economically vulnerable and
dependent on the state to satisfy their basic needs.58 Individuals and
communities subject to property-induced invisibility have a moral right to
compensation.
Using historical examples, the chart below portrays the nuances of the
five criteria for property-induced invisibility. My claim is that all five cri-
teria must be satisfied in order for property-induced invisibility to result.
The answers I have provided below are not intended to be definitive, and
I encourage debate as to whether the historical examples used actually do
or do not satisfy the five criteria. My primary objective is to give readers
a sense of how to apply the criteria and establish an understanding of
both the expansiveness and the limits of property-induced invisibility.
CONTOURS OF PROPERTY-INDUCED INVISIBILITY
Property con- Executed such Perpetrated by Adversely Such that com-
fiscations with that dehumani- the state or affecting pow- munities, indi-
no payment of zation occurs other prevailing erless people(s) viduals or their
just compensa- power struc- or people(s) heirs are effec-
tion ture(s) made powerless tively left eco-






Property confiscated during slavery, colonialism and/or Apartheid
Black farmers Yes. Yes, Yes. Yes. Yes.
in South Africa Most times Colonialist and Land was first The fact that Forced to move
under colonial- payment was Apartheid gov- taken by victims owned to Bantustans,
ism and not made, but ernments con- England, the land signified where land was
Apartheid. 5 9  in rare in- spicuously colonial power, they were bet- infer-
58. Defineq in this manner, property-induced invisibility is always a violation of
human rights because "human rights 'derive from the inherent dignity of the human per-
son' ... [and] are, by definition, the rights one has simply because one is a human being."
INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK OF HUMAN RIGHrS 1 (Jack Donnelly & Rhoda E. Howard
eds., 1987) (citations omitted). Therefore, any action that causes dehumanization is a vio-
lation of these rights. Due to the dehumanization component, invisibility always involves a
violation of human rights, but a violation of human rights does not always result in
invisibility.
The human right that most directly deals with the confiscation of property is found in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). It asserts that a person arbitrarily deprived of
her property with no just compensation is entitled to an effective remedy. Id. at 74 ("No
one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."). See also id. at 73 ("Everyone has the
right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fun-
damental rights granted him by the constitution or by law."). It is important to further
note that the realization of certain economic and social rights (for example, the right to
housing) requires citizens to have a basic level of property.
59. Confiscation of native land began with the arrival of the Dutch in the 17th century,
and mass land removals continued until the 1980s as racist Apartheid land policies man-
dated the forced removal of blacks from their farmland. See generally LAURINE PLATZKY
& CHERRYL WALKER, THE SURPLUS PEOPLE: FORCED REMOVALS IN SOUTH AFRICA
(1985) (discussing in detail the removal of Black South Africans from their land); Lauren
G. Robinson, Rationales for Rural Land Redistribution in South Africa, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L
L. 465 (1997) (providing a concise history of land removals in South Africa).
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60. Hutu desire to confiscate Tutsi property was one impetus behind the 1994 killings
and exacerbated the devastating after-effects of the genocide. See Mark A. Drumbl, Pun-
ishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221,
1249-50 (2000) (noting that some Hutu "pillaged, stole, ransacked, and appropriated prop-
erty from homes in which Tutsi had been killed or from which they had fled"). See also
MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICrIMS BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM, NATIVISM, AND
THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 197 (2001) (citing a USAID-commissioned study which attrib-
utes conflicts between neighbors to land scarcity, and concludes by saying "[d]isputes over
land are reported to have been a major motivation for Rwandans to denounce neighbors
during the ethnic conflicts of 1994") (citations omitted); GERARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA
CRISIS: HISTORY OF A GENOCIDE 248 (1995) (noting while the desire to acquire Tutsi land
was not the primary motivation behind the 1994 mass killings; there was "an element of
material interest in the killings.... Villagers also probably had a vague hope that if things
settled down after the massacres they could obtain pieces of land belonging to the victims,
a strong lure in such a land-starved country as Rwanda").
Property con- Executed such Perpetrated by Adversely Such that com-
fiscations with that dehumani- the state or affecting pow- munities, indi-
no payment of zation occurs other prevailing erless people(s) viduals or their
just compensa- power struc- or people(s) heirs are effec-
tion ture(s) made powerless tively left eco-






Property- stances when it believed that and subsequent ter off than ior and over-
induced invisi- was, it was not non-whites Apartheid gov- other unprop- populated, and
bility applicable adequate. were subhuman ernments ertied Blacks, hence poverty
savages, erected legal but never as rampant.
architecture to well off as simi-
further system- larly situated
atically dispos- white land
sess Blacks. owners. Black
land owners




Property confiscated during war or social unrest
Tutsi and mod- Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
erate Hutu in There was a Tutsis and The state broke Both Hutus Thousands
Rwanda6 0  massive those who down after and Tutsis were died, those who
Property- exchange of aided them Habyarimana poor, most liv- survived were
induced invisi- land from Tutsi were widely was killed; con- ing on less than forced to flee
bility applicable to Hutu hands referred to as sequently, the $1 per day. and leave all of
and, for the roaches in need Hutu generals Tutsis were their posses-
most part, com- of extermina- responsible for made especially sions behind.
pensation was tion. the massacre powerless in
never paid. were the pre- the face of the
vailing power Hutus who
structure at the committed
time. genocide.
Property con- Executed such Perpetrated by Adversely Such that com-
fiscations with that dehumani- the state or affecting pow- munities, indi-
no payment of zation occurs other prevailing erless people(s) viduals or their
just compensa. power struc- or people(s) heirs are effec-
tion ture(s) made powerless tively left eco-






Japanese in Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
American Some property Their equal Internment was Those interned Many were
internment was restored or standing as instituted by were of various robbed of their
camps during compensated law-abiding citi- the US govern- socio-economic jobs and prop-
World War through sym- zens was revok- ment. All three standings, but erty, and thus
1161 bolic repara- ed, and they government all were made were forced to
Property- tions, but most were dehuman- branches were powerless by rely on welfare
induced invisi- of it was not. ized and forced involved in the internment, for their basicto live in squal- authorizing the sustenance andbility applicable id internment internment. left economi-




British Crown Yes. Yes. Yes. No. No.
after the Amer- Lands that Although When the lands The British The loss of the
ican Revolu- once belonged American revo- were confis- Crown was far American colo-
tion 6 2  to the British lutionaries were cated, America from powerless nies did not
Property- Crown were fighting against was not yet a before and make Britain a
induced invisi- transferred to a more power- state, but quali- after the Amer- poor nation.
bility inapplica- the administra- ful adversary fied as the pre- ican Revolu-ble tors of the col- that they re- vailing power tion.
onies after the spected and structure at the
Revolution and often tried to time because
no compensa- emulate, war is the revolution-
tion was paid per se an aries had mili-
for the lands. attempt to tary control
dehumanize or over many
kill the enemy. towns.
61. See generally PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE STORY OF THE JAPANESE
AMERICAN INTERNMENT CASES (1983); ERIC K. YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS, AND
REPARATION: LAW AND THE JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT (2001); Jerry Kang, Deny-
ing Prejudice: Internment, Redress, and Denial, 51 UCLA L. REV. 933 (2004). See also Lika
C. Miyake, Forsaken and Forgotten: The U.S. Internment of Japanese Peruvians During
World War 11, 9 ASIAN L.J. 163, 163-64 (2002) (describing the experiences of Japanese
Peruvians during the War, their deportation following the war, and lack of reparations
provided to them).
62. Property-induced invisibility is not applicable to the British Crown, but would be
applicable to the Loyalists who fought in the war and, after their property was confiscated,
were left powerless, poor, and dependent on the state for their basic needs. Confiscation
of Loyalist property during the American Revolution began with the seizure of Tory assets
in 1775, and later came to include confiscation of Loyalist land. While some loyalists were
able to recover confiscated property through American courts following the war, most
Loyalists "never attempted to recover any of their losses..." David E. Maas, The Massa-
chusetts Loyalists and the Problem of Amnesty, 1775-1790, in LOYALISTS AND COMMUNITY
IN NORTH AMERICA 72 (Robert M. Calhoon et al. eds., 1994). See also ADELE HAST, Loy-
ALISM IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA: THE NORFOLK AREA AND THE EASTERN SHORE 181
(1982) (noting that as a result of a 1779 Act, British property became "vested in the com-
monwealth [of Virginia]"); ROBERT STANSBURY LAMBERT, SOUTH CAROLINA LOYALISTS
IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 239 (1987) (noting that the South Carolina law permitting
the confiscation of British property stated that "the state could no longer protect the prop-
erty of persons who had supported the Crown" because of prior British confiscation and
destruction of South Carolina property).
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Property con- Executed such Perpetrated by Adversely Such that com-
fiscations with that dehumani- the state or affecting pow- munities, indi-
no payment of zation occurs other prevailing erless people(s) viduals or their
just compensa- power struc- or people(s) heirs are effec-
tion ture(s) made powerless tively left eco-






Property confiscated by the state for a purported social purpose
White farmers Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
after the 2002 White-owned For years, The state had White land Those farmers
land grab in farms were blacks had direct involve- owners were who had no
Zimbabwe 6 3  targeted by the been dehuman- ment in the among the other assets on
Property- ZANU-PF and ized by colonial planning and wealthiest peo- which to rely
induced invisi- no compensa- and white set- execution of pie in after their land
bility applicable tion has been tiers; the the land grabs. Zimbabwe, but was taken
paid. ZANU-PF- many were became eco-
orchestrated made powerless nomically vul-
land grabs were by the land nerable.
an attempt to grabs.
turn the tables.
Expropriations No. No. Yes. No. No (condi-
of property in Just compensa- In the worst- State powers of Owners receive tional).
the U.S. under tion is paid. case scenario, expropriation just compensa- Only renters
the "public there may be are used. tion. who were pay-
use" clause for collusion ing below mar-
construction of between local ket rent prior
privately owned authorities and to expropria-
develot private devel- tion and are
ments.pl opers, resulting unable to find
Property- in unjust another apart-
induced invisi- enrichment but ment with
bility inapplica- not dehumani- reduced rent
ble zation. can be left eco-
nomically vul-
nerable.
63. Zimbabwe President Robert Mugabe's Fast Track Land Reform program, which
began in 2000, employed controversial legal and political tactics to expropriate land from
white landowners and redistribute it to blacks. See Tom Tirivangani, LAW, LAND REFORM
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: A CASE FOR ZIMBABWE 156-66 (2004) (providing a detailed analysis
of the political impetus and legislation behind the Fast Track program); Thomas W. Mitch-
ell, The Land Crisis in Zimbabwe: Getting Beyond the Myopic Focus Upon Black & White,
11 IND. IN'L & CoMP. L. REV. 587, 590 (2001) (providing a summary of Zimbabwe's land
redistribution programs since Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980). See generally
CATHERINE BUCKLE, AFRICAN TEARS: THE ZIMBABWE LAND INVASIONS (2001); ISAAC
MAPOSA, LAND REFORM IN ZIMBABWE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAND ACQUISITION ACT
(1992) COMBINED WITH A CASE STUDY ANALYSIS OF THE RESETTLEMENT PROGRAMME
(1995); LUKE ZUNGA, FARM INVASIONS IN ZIMBABWE: IS ZIMBABWE A DEMOCR ACY?
(2003); The Great Terrain Robbery: Plunder in Zimbabwe, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 17, 2002,
at 45.
64. Supreme Court cases have interpreted the public use requirement broadly. Lead-
ing Supreme Court public use clause cases include: Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S.
469, 489-90 (2005) (holding that the taking of private property in order to facilitate devel-
opment constituted a public use within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment); Haw. Hous.
Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1984) (expounding upon the court and legislature's
role in determining what constitutes public use); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954)
(discussing the court's role in determining what constitutes public use). For detailed dis-
cussion on the public use requirement, see, for example, Thomas W. Merrill, The Econom-
ics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 64-66 (1986).
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65. See generally Richard W. Crowder, Restitution in the Czech Republic: Problems
and Prague-Nosis, 5 IND. INT'L. & CoMP. L. REv. 237, 238 (1994) (noting that outside of
the Soviet Union itself, the greatest magnitude of property confiscation and nationalization
occurred in the Czech Republic); Frances H. Foster, Restitution of Expropriated Property:
Post-Soviet Lessons for Cuba, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 621 (1996); Rainer Frank,
Privatization in Eastern Germany: A Comprehensive Study, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L.
809, 813-15 (1994) (noting that Communist expropriations in East Germany occurred both
under the Soviet occupation from 1945-1948, and under the East German Government
from 1949-1989). The Communist examples are unique because land was confiscated in
order to give effect to a drastically different conception of property: Individual ownership
was widely prohibited, while collective ownership became the norm. This is in contrast to
the vast majority of situations, where the status of property in society did not change, only
the owners did. Under Communism, the purported reason for the shift from individual to
collective ownership was to create a more egalitarian society, where humanity was valued
above property. In this context, it is important to note that dehumanization only results
from the actual violent taking of property or a credible threat to do so, rather than the
Communist reordering or property arrangements taken alone.
Property con- Executed such Perpetrated by Adversely Such that com-
fiscations with that dehumani- the state or affecting pow- munities, indi-
no payment of zation occurs other prevailing erless people(s) viduals or their
just compensa- power struc- or people(s) heirs are effec-
tion ture(s) made powerless tively left eco-
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1. Confiscation or destruction of property from owner(s) with no
payment of just compensation:
Property-induced invisibility is relevant when compensation is not paid
at all, or if it is not just (that is, inadequate or accepted under conditions
of duress, fraud, or extreme asymmetrical information). The form and
amount of just compensation should be contextual. Just compensation
can be the fair market value of property at the time of confiscation or
destruction. Alternatively, it could entail a settlement reached in negoti-
ations free from significant duress or asymmetries of information that
would capture a property's non-market and market value.
66. In the debates leading to the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, Republi-
cans were divided on the question of whether the writers of the Constitution viewed slaves
as property. This question was closely linked to the debate on whether slave owners should
receive compensation for the emancipation of slaves. Some Republicans felt that no slave
owners should be compensated, but most Republicans believed slave owners in loyal states
should be compensated. In the end, in part due to the growing hostility toward slave own-
ers as the Civil War continued, Republicans "backed a constitutional amendment that said
nothing about compensation." However, the Congress "refused to deny explicitly that
loyal slave owners should be reimbursed for their loss, thus leaving open the possibility of
further legislation granting compensation." See MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM:
THE CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLITION OF SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT 109
(2001). In contrast, the British Emancipation Act gave slave owners compensation of
twenty million pounds and the option of keeping slaves on as paid apprentices for up to six
years. See Seymour Drescher, Abolitionist Expectations: Britain, in AFTER SLAVERY:
EMANCIPATION AND ITS DISCONTENTs 54 (Howard Temperley ed., 2000).
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2. Executed such that dehumanization occurs:
Pateman and Mills convincingly argue that removal from the social
contract is predicated upon various forms of dehumanization. At its core,
[D]ehumanization involves denying a person "identity"-a percep-
tion of the person "as an individual, independent and distinguishable
from others, capable of making choices"-and "community"-a per-
ception of the other as "part of an interconnected network of indi-
viduals who care for each other." When people are divested of these
agentic and communal aspects of humanness they are deindividu-
ated, lose the capacity to evoke compassion and moral emotions, and
may be treated as means toward vicious ends.67
For example, the South African Apartheid-era government's overt be-
lief that Blacks were sub-human, the militant Hutus' belief that Tutsis'
lives were worth no more than cockroaches', and the subsequent property
confiscations or destruction based on these beliefs are strong forms of
dehumanization. Dehumanization will also result insofar as property is
confiscated in the context of a deadly war or rebellion (death is the most
extreme form of dehumanization).
There is a spectrum of offenses that do not reach the point of dehu-
manization but do reduce an individual or community's dignity.68 For
instance, if a modern day Robin Hood steals someone's property because
she is exorbitantly wealthy while others have too little, this will not neces-
sarily lead to the dispossessed's dehumanization. The theft may result,
however, in a blow to her dignity.
3. Perpetrated by the state or other prevailing power structure(s):
The social contract is an agreement between a state and its citizens, so
only 'state action or inaction (often in the form of structural inequality
that it tolerates) can forcibly remove citizens and make them invisible.
The state's responsibility for a person or community's invisibility is con-
tingent upon its level of culpability. For example, during Hurricane Ka-
trina, United States shores along the Gulf of Mexico were ravished,
people were displaced or died, and billions of dollars worth of property
was destroyed.6 9 Hurricanes are an uncontrollable act of nature, but the
67. Nick Haslam, Dehumanization: An Integrative Review, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. REV. 252, 254 (2006) (quoting H. C. Kelman, Violence Without Restraint: Reflec-
tions on the Dehumanization of Victims and Victimizers, in VARIETIES OF PSYCHOHISTORY
301 (G.M. Kren & L.H. Rappoport eds., 1976)).
68. For example, when property is a constitutive part of someone's personhood, its
confiscation may adversely affect their dignity, but does not necessarily result in dehumani-
zation. For a longer discussion of the property as personhood idea, see Margaret Jane
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 971-78 (1982). Locke also had a
conception of property as personhood. He believed that property in things was based
upon property in/ownership of one's self (that is, one's labor and work). Consequently,
when a person mixes their labor with a thing, it becomes his. See LOCKE, supra note 33, at
101.
69. See generally MICHAEL E. DYSON, COME HELL OR HIGH WATER: HURRICANE
KATRINA AND THE COLOR OF DISASTER (2006).
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damage was deeply intensified by the fact that the state (both federal and
local governments) knew the levees were faulty and furthermore, failed
to respond adequately once the scale of the devastation became appar-
ent.70 Watching the post-hurricane chaos that erupted in the Superdome,
it was evident that scores of people were dehumanized by the effect of
state inaction. To the extent that the state had a duty to keep the levees
in good condition and respond adequately but failed to do so, it is respon-
sible for the invisibility although the hurricane was an act of God.
There may be situations in which the state is not complicit, but is non-
existent or simply too weak to stop the dispossession. In this case, it is a
non-state actor that becomes the prevailing power structure, steps into
the shoes of the state, and renders people invisible. This occurred, for
example, in Nazi-occupied territories during World War II. Although
many of the governments in the occupied territories were still nominally
in power, the Nazis were the true prevailing power structure that dictated
the new terms of the social contract and caused widespread death and
invisibility among the Roma, Sinti, Jews, and other groups.
4. Adversely affects powerless people or people made powerless by the
act:
Throughout history, certain people have been targets of confiscations
because they were economically powerless and thus vulnerable. The
scapegoating of Roma and Sinti people-an economically powerless and
vulnerable group-during World War II is an example of this. On the
other hand, Jews were not an economically vulnerable group, but were
nevertheless targeted as a reviled ethnic group. In fact, Nazi confisca-
tions were fueled, in part, by anger and envy concerning the perceived
economic prosperity of Jews. 71 The expropriation of their property was
all part of a larger attempt to make this allegedly economically powerful
group not just powerless, but extinct.
5. Such that individuals, communities, or their heirs are effectively left
economically vulnerable and dependent on the state to satiate
their basic needs:
Locke argued that any act by the state that places a man in the state's
absolute power is grounds for dissolution of the social contract. 72 Follow-
70. FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMIT-
TEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA, H.
R. Rep. No. 109-377, pts. 6, 15, at 90, 313 (2006) ("Potential for Katrina to breach levees
was well-known..."); id. at 313 ("There was inappropriate delay in getting people out of
shelters and into temporary housing-delays that officials should have foreseen due to
manufacturing limitations.").
71. See AVRAHAM BARKAI, FROM BOYCOT TO ANNIHILATION: THE ECONOMIC
STRUGGLE OF GERMAN JEWS, 1933-1943, at 4-5 (William Templer trans., Univ. Press of
New England 1989) (1987); FRANK BAJOHR, 'ARYANISATION' IN HAMBURG: THE ECO-
NOMIC EXCLUSION OF JEWS AND THE CONFISCATION OF THEIR PROPERTY IN NAZI GER-
MANY 1-7 (2002).
72. See LOCKE, supra note 33, at 278-84.
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ing the same logic, when a state confiscates or destroys property, and
leaves a person or community economically vulnerable and dependent on
the state to meet her basic needs, the act of confiscation or destruction
can effectively remove that person from the social contract, causing prop-
erty-induced invisibility. There are many acts of property confiscation or
destruction that will not leave a person economically vulnerable or de-
pendent on the state. These occur when the person or community is able
to use various economic buffers to avoid property-induced invisibility. 73
For example, the Apartheid government could have confiscated the
land of a Black farmer who maintained other assets apart from the land;
for example, a profitable store. If the confiscation did not leave her or
her descendants economically dependent on the government, it was un-
just, but did not cause property-induced invisibility.74 The farmer and her
descendants should receive compensation, but in a world of limited re-
sources, she should not be given priority over those who have had no
economic buffer.
Although the presence of an economic buffer prevents property-in-
duced invisibility from occurring, other types of invisibility could result.
To address other forms of invisibility, it is crucial for any program de-
signed to restore past rights in land to be accompanied by redistributive
measures not based on past rights, but rather on need.
My central argument in this subpart has been that, as a baseline, those
subject to property-induced invisibility should be restored; though, in cer-
tain situations the magnitude of property confiscations renders irrelevant
the considerations of who, at a minimum, should be restored. For exam-
ple, after the Rwandan genocide of 1994, thousands of people suffered
from property-induced invisibility. Estimates suggest that half of
Rwanda's population was somehow displaced, which means significant
amounts of property were confiscated or unwillingly abandoned as a con-
sequence of the genocide. 75 If the national government decides to return
property to those dispossessed, it does not have sufficient resources to
restore all those subject to property-induced invisibility. Nonetheless, in
these types of cases, international donor funds should help indigent coun-
tries to compensate individuals and communities subject to property-in-
duced invisibility.
B. WIDESPREAD PROPERTY-INDUCED INVISIBILITY CAN LEAD TO
INCREASED ENFORCEMENT COSTS AND POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC INSTABILITY
The probability of violent backlashes is determined by an oppressed
group's numbers, their reaction to their invisibility, their coalition-build-
73. Invisibility of other types could result, although the presence of an economic
buffer prevents property-induced invisibility from occurring.
74. Property-induced invisibility occurs at the time of expropriation, but can persist
over generations if the dispossessed's descendants never recover from the initial taking.
75. See PRUNIER, supra note 60, at 312-13.
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ing skills, and the adeptness of the state at quelling discontent. Invisible
people can react to their dehumanization and exclusion by either trying
harder to conform to societal norms in hopes of gaining acceptance, or by
rejecting societal norms and laws altogether.
By "passing" for a group that is accepted, some are able to eclipse the
identity that causes their invisibility. 76 There are others who, while they
do not deny the identity that is the source of their oppression, do become
obsessed with conforming to societal standards in hopes of winning the
respect of those in society who are visible.77 This spectrum of oppressed
people's reactions to their invisibility is the least threatening to societal
stability.78
In contrast, there are those who have embraced their condition of in-
visibility and derive a certain freedom from it. Invisible people are not
morally bound by a society's rules, since they are not part of the social
contract (or are relegated to an inferior position therein). 79 A social con-
tract only morally binds contracting parties; those outside of or subju-
gated by the contract may acquiesce or comply as they desire, but a moral
imperative to do so is absent. For example, the legal system in South
Africa during its Apartheid era codified Blacks as inferior human beings,
explicitly excluded them from the democratic enterprise, and therefore
failed to bind Blacks morally to the legal system of the time. Although
Blacks may have conformed to a system that excluded them and consid-
ered them subhuman, they had no moral imperative to do so. A positive
and negative freedom can arise from this lack of moral attachment to the
existing system of rules.80
76. "Passing" is when a person attempts to avoid or hide the source of their oppression
by passing for another more accepted group. This is a mechanism people often use to
eclipse their invisibility. In the Jim Crow South and Apartheid-era South Africa, blacks
with lighter skin frequently tried to "pass" in society as white, thereby eluding altogether
their source of oppression. For more on the phenomenon of passing, see generally GRA-
HAM WATSON, PASSING FOR WHITE: A STUDY OF RACIAL ASSIMILATION IN A SOUTH AF-
RICAN SCHOOL (1970); Amy Robinson, It One to Know One: Passing and Communities of
Common Interest, 20 CRITICAL INQUIRY 715, 728 (1994).
77. See EVELYN BROOKS HIGGINBOTHAM, RIGHTEOUS DISCONTENT: THE WOMEN'S
MOVEMENT IN THE BLACK BArIST CHURCH 1880-1920, at 187-88 (1993) (discussing how
African American women conformed to societal standards to increase the visibility of their
movement: "Although the Baptist church provided women an oppositional space in which
to protest vigorously against social injustice," their movement to gain respectability ulti-
mately "reflected and reinforced the hegemonic values of white America...").
78. There are also varieties of social myths that prevent people from rebelling and thus
ensure societal stability. For instance, the myth of the divine right of kings (and divinely-
sanctioned subservience of serfs) that dominated feudal times, or the myth that blacks are
the cursed sons and daughters of Ham that God intended to be slaves. In many situations,
people accept their station in society and the blatant injustices that go with it because they
truly believe that their suffering is consistent with the will of God. Social myths lead peo-
ple to accept their invisibility rather than engage in social struggle to become visible.
79. LOCKE, supra note 33, at 350. The moral legitimacy of social control is based upon
the social contract. When the state removes individuals or communities from the social
contract, it can no longer subject them to social control that is morally legitimate.
80. See Daniel Markovits, Democratic Disobedience, 114 YALE L.J. 1897, 1902 (2005).
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A positive freedom results when people are not morally attached to a
legal regime that renders them invisible, and they then use this freedom
to violate laws in an attempt to inject a dose of morality into an ignoble
society.81 For instance, in the Jim Crow South, sit-ins violated the legal
architecture of segregation in order to bring about a society where blacks
were treated as equals instead of sub-persons. Brave individuals were
able to transform their lack of moral adhesion to the laws that oppressed
them into protest actions that served to subvert those very same laws.
The exercise of positive freedom can entail a non-violent or violent strat-
egy, so long as the intent is to bring about a more just world.
On the other hand, a negative freedom results when people use their
lack of moral adhesion to engage in self-enrichment or morally dubious
activities. 82 Through his protagonist in Invisible Man, Ralph Ellison ar-
ticulates a possible reason one would engage in negative freedoms as fol-
lows: "Irresponsibility is part of my invisibility. But to whom can I be
responsible, and why should I be, when you refuse to see me?" 83 Gang-
sters that terrorized South Africa's townships during Apartheid are a per-
fect example. The gangsters robbed people and engaged in a plethora of
illegal activities. These young men lived under a system that sought to
dehumanize them and hence had no moral imperative to abide by the
immoral legal framework. However, they used this freedom as a license
to escape all standards of comportment, even the morally legitimate, cus-
tomary traditions that prevailed in the townships.
When either positive or negative freedoms arise, people are driven to
the point at which they sincerely feel that they have little to lose in oppos-
ing the government and its laws.84 Invisibility is most likely to result in
increased enforcement costs or disorder when those made invisible either
constitute a substantial portion of the population or are able to form co-
alitions and inspire others to take part in their protest actions.8 5 Society
81. Id. (arguing that the exercise of positive freedoms edifies democracy and that "po-
litical disobedience can provide for the broader political process by correcting democratic
deficits in law and policy that inevitably threaten every democracy"); see also RONALD
DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 105 (1985).
82. This is the conception of invisibility espoused by Glaucon in Book II of Plato's
Republic in his attempt to explain the nature of justice. In the myth of Gyges, a sheperd
discovers a gold ring that has the power to make him invisible. Invisibility allows Gyges to
break the law with impunity. He uses his newly found power to seduce the queen, kill the
king, and usurp his kingdom. He derives a negative freedom from his invisibility. See
PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 37-71 (G.R.F. Ferrari ed., Tom Griffith trans., 2000) (360 B.C.).
83. ELLISON, supra note 28, at 14.
84. See also PATTERSON, supra note 30, at 2 ("[T]otal personal power taken to its
extreme contradicts itself by its very existence, for total domination can become a form of
extreme dependence on the object of one's power, and total powerlessness can become the
secret path to control of the subject that attempts to exercise such power." (quoting GE-
ORG HEGEL, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE MIND 228-40 (J.B. Ballice trans., Swann Son-
nenschein 1910) (1807)).
85. At one end of the spectrum, there is full compliance with the law, and at the other
end, there are unmet expectations and chaos. In between these two extremes is a space
where prevalent property-induced invisibility, at the very least, causes the cost of enforcing
property rights to increase. The misaligned expectations caused by property-induced invis-
ibility can be rectified through restoration of property. See Leonid Polishchuk, Distribu-
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functions under the status quo only so long as the majority of people
adhere to the established rules and those who do not can be contained.
Containment depends upon the state's ability to meet the expectations of
the majority. Bentham rightly argued that,
To the extent laws are concordant with expectations, one may hy-
pothesize that they will be willingly complied with by a substantial
number of people. The fact that laws are rooted in common expecta-
tions thus facilitates willing compliance; the latter in turn, fosters re-
spect for the law and law-makers. Compliance on a large scale helps
legitimation of law and the authority of the law-makers.8
6
To the extent that the state is unable to meet the majority's expecta-
tions and secure their willing compliance with the law, it can use its police
power to force those exercising negative and positive freedoms to com-
ply.8 7 The cost of enforcing property rights will increase in proportion to
the extent the police power must be invoked.8 8 There may come a point,
however, at which the state's military prowess and social institutions can-
not contain disobedient populations, and disorder will prevail. That is,
while the fabric of society can withstand losing a few threads, there comes
a certain point when a frayed fabric can do nothing but fall apart.8 9 To
prevent this, the state must transform and thus legitimize the property
status quo.90
tion of Assets and Credibility of Property Rights 3 (Mar. 2, 2004) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://harrisschool.uchicago.edu/Academic/workshops/polecon-
archive.asp ("[Tihe cost of enforcement of property rights is observed to be positively cor-
related with the inequality of their allocation in the society. . . . Destitution provokes
attempts on others' property, partly for a lack of socially productive alternatives, partly
because those undertaking such attempts have little to lose.").
86. BENTHAM, supra note 11 (emphasis added).
87. Perceptions of illegitimacy that can ignite social mayhem are suppressed through
the criminal justice system, where the focus is to maintain the status quo through social
control. For a review of the social control theories underlying criminal law, see DAVID
GARLAND, PUNISHMENT AND MODERN SOCIETY: A STUDY IN SOCIAL THEORY 3-22
(1990); RICHARD QUINNEY, CRITIQUE OF LEGAL ORDER: CRIME CONTROL IN CAPITALIST
SOCIETY 51--55 (1974) (arguing that through class repression, the criminal justice system
is intended to maintain the status quo); Donald Black, Crime as Social Control, 48 AM.
Soc. REV. 34-45 (1983); Allen E. Liska, A Critical Examination of Macro Perspectives on
Crime Control, 13 ANN. REV. Soc. 67, 67-88 (1987).
88. See Tyler, supra note 20, at 376 ("The use of power, particularly coercive power,
requires a large expenditure of resources to obtain models and limited amounts of influ-
ence over other. It is therefore important that under some circumstances people are also
influenced by others because they believe that the decisions made and rules enacted by
others are in some way right or proper and ought to be followed."); see also, Morris
Zelditch, Processes of Legitimation: Recent Developments and New Directions, 64 Soc.
PSYCHOL. QUARTERLY. 4, 4-6 (2001).
89. Using Locke's imagery, widespread non-cooperation throws society back into a
state of nature, which is bound to devolve into a state of war. See LOCKE, supra note 33, at
278-84.
90. Many scholars have noted that land reform can prevent revolution and as well as
other forms of political instability. See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, POLITICAL ORDER
IN CHANGING SOCIETIES 375 (1968); B. Curtis Eaton & William D. White, The Distribution
of Wealth and the Efficiency of Institutions, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 336, 336 (1991) ("We find
circumstances in which redistribution of wealth is Pareto optimal and in which increasing




Under international law, a person who has property confiscated has
various rights to the return of her property.91 Because property-induced
invisibility is not only caused by the confiscation of property, the mere
return of property will not be sufficient to correct it. Dehumanization
and exclusion are central to property-induced invisibility. A society that
is committed to the process of moral regeneration must find a way to
include victims in the democratic project to affirm their humanity. A so-
ciety can do this by giving invisible people or communities asset-based
choices, which facilitate active participation in the remedial process and
bring dignity to those formerly dehumanized.
Reparation is the return of property that does not emphasize rebuild-
Appropriation, and Land Reform, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 705, 711 (1994); Karl Moene, Pov-
erty and Landownership, 82 AM. ECON. REV. 52, 52 (1992); Edward N. Muller et al., Land
Inequality and Political Violence, 83 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 577, 579-86 (1989); Bruce Russett,
Inequality and Instability: The Relation of Land Tenure to Politics, 16 WORLD POLITICS 442,
453 (1964); cf T. David Mason, "Take Two Acres and Call Me in the Morning": Is Land
Reform a Prescription for Peasant Unrest?, 60 J. POL. 199 (1998) (noting the ineffectiveness
of land reform when accompanied by a rise in state violence aimed at repression): Manus
Midlarsky, Rulers and Ruled: Patterned Inequality and the Onset of Mass Political Violence,
82 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 491, 504 (1988).
91. See ScoTT LECKIE, New Directions in Housing and Property Restitution, in RE-
TURNING HOME: HOUSING AND PROPERTY RESTITUTION RIGHTS OF REFUGEES AND Dis-
PLACED PERSONS 3 (Scott Leckie ed., 2003); Scott Leckie, Housing and Property Issues for
Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in the Context of Return: Key Considerations for
UNHCR Policy and Practice, REFUGEE SURV. Q. No. 3 2000, at 5-63. International human
rights provisions entitling individuals to property restoration include: (1) the right to resto-
ration of housing, land or property, see Report of the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, 2(c), U.N. Doc. A/51/18 (Aug. 16, 1996) ("All such refugees and
displaced persons have, after their return to their homes of origin, the right to have re-
stored to them property of which they were deprived in the course of the conflict and to be
compensated appropriately for any such property that cannot be restored to them."); (2)
the right of those displaced to return to their homes and places of habitual residence in
their country should they so wish, see U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-
Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination & Prot. of Minorities, Housing and Property
Restoration in the Context of the Return of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons, 91 1,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/Res/1998/26 (Aug. 26, 1998) ("The Sub-Commission on Preven-
tion of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities... [r]eaffirms the right of all refugees,
as defined in relevant international legal instruments, and internally displaced persons to
return to their homes and places of habitual residence in their country and/or place of
origin, should they so wish."); Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Dis-
crimination, 2(a), U.N. Doc.A/51/18 (Aug. 16, 1996) ("All such refugees and displaced
persons have the right freely to return to their homes of origin under conditions of
safety."); (3) the right to compensation for land lost as the result of a forced eviction, see
U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination &
Prot. of Minorities, Expert Seminar on the Practice of Forced Evictions, 91 24, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.211997/7 (July 2, 1997) (Section 24 provides that "[a]ll person[s] subjected to any
forced eviction ... should have a right to compensation for any losses of land or personal,
real or other property or goods..."); and (4) the state's obligation to make reparation for
injury, see U.N. GAOR Int'l L. Comm'n, Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, Art. 31, 34-37, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, ch. IV.E.1 (2001) (Article 31, Section 1
provides that "[t]he responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the
injury caused by the internationally wrongful act." Article 34 provides that "[f]ull repara-
tion for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of restitu-
tion, compensation and satisfaction either singly or in combination.").
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ing a relationship to society,92 while restoration is the return of property
that emphasizes rebuilding a relationship to society through asset-based
choices. 93 Reparation, as opposed to restoration, is currently the goal in
various programs designed to restore past rights in property.94 If return
of the stolen property is not possible (for example, if a bona fide pur-
chaser is in possession of the property), then the judge or administrator
often orders the state to provide monetary compensation, or sometimes
alternative land, if available. 95 The judge or administrator chooses the
appropriate remedy. While this approach is effective in achieving repara-
tions, it fails to capitalize upon a prime opportunity to restore a person or
community's relationship to society.
In order to restore an individual or community's relationship to society,
the restorative process must be asset-based, driven from the bottom-up,
and defined by choice. To facilitate the process, the legislature can devise
and authorize a standard list of assets from which dispossessed popula-
92. In the legal literature, the definition for reparations is consistent, although subtle
differences exist. See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Current Reparations Debate, 36
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1051, 1055 (2003) (emphasizing four features of reparations: "1) a
focus on the past to account for the present; 2) a focus on the present, to reveal the contin-
uing existence of race-based discrimination; 3) an accounting of past harms or injuries that
have not been compensated; and 4) a challenge to society to devise ways to respond as a
whole to the uncompensated harms identified in point '3"); Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
689, 691 (2003) (noting that: "[p]aradigmatic examples of reparations typically refer to
schemes that (1) provide payment (in cash or in kind) to a large group of claimants, (2) on
the basis of wrongs that were substantively permissible under prevailing law when commit-
ted, (3) in which current law bars a compulsory remedy for the past wrong..., and (4) in
which the payment is justified on backward-looking grounds of corrective justice, rather
than forward looking grounds such as the deterrence of future wrongdoing.").
93. See John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice: Assessing Optimistic and Pessimistic Ac-
counts, 25 CRIME & JUST. 1, 6 (1999) (emphasizing the following objectives of restorative
justice: "restoring property loss, restoring injury, restoring a sense of security, restoring
dignity, restoring a sense of empowerment, restoring deliberative democracy, restoring
harmony based on a feeling that justice has been done, and restoring social support"); John
Braithwaite, A Future Where Punishment Is Marginalized: Realistic or Utopian?, 46 UCLA
L. REV. 1727, 1743 (1999) (describing restorative justice as "a process of bringing together
the individuals who have been affected by an offense and having them agree on how to
repair the harm.... The purpose is to restore victims, restore offenders, and restore com-
munities in a way that all stakeholders can agree is just."); David Dolinko, Restorative
Justice and the Justification of Punishment, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 319, 319 ("Restorative jus-
tice . . . 'involves the victim, the offender, and the community in a search for solutions
which promote repair, reconciliation, and reassurance."' (quoting HOWARD ZEHR,
CHANGING LENSES: A NEW Focus FOR CRIME AND JUSTICE 181 (1990))); Mark S. Um-
breit, Holding Juvenile Offenders Accountable: A Restorative Justice Perspective, Juv. &
FAM. CT. J., Spring 1995, at 31, 32 ("Rather than defining 'the state' as the victim, restora-
tive justice theory views criminal and delinquent behavior as first a conflict between indi-
viduals .... [B]oth victim and offender are placed in active problem solving roles."); .
94. This is the case in South Africa, Germany, and the Czech Republic. See Michael
L. Neff, Comment, Eastern Europe's Policy of Restoration of Property in the 1990s, 10
DICK. J. INT'L L. 357, 364-73 (1992) (discussing restoration policy in East Germany and the
Czech Republic); Foster, supra note 65, at 621, 626-41 (1996) (discussing restoration pro-
grams in the Baltic States); infra Part IV and accompanying discussion about the South
African LRP.
95. See generally, Neff, supra note 94, at 364-73.
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tions can choose.96 For example, the dispossessed should be able to
choose, inter alia, return of expropriated property (if possible), a cash
payment, an asset account applicable to education, health, housing or re-
tirement, free vocational training or higher education for two genera-
tions, priority within an established housing program, or highly subsidized
access to credit.97 The standard list of assets should be tailored to the
economic, social, political, and historical realities of each country. The
standard list, however, is not enough. The dispossessed should also be
allowed to suggest completely self-styled remedies. The state is not ex-
pected to give effect to every asset-based option proposed, but rather
only those that are reasonable and within its budgetary restraints. Deter-
mining what is reasonable should be part of a consultative process involv-
ing the state and the dispossessed, supported by their civil society
representatives.
It is important to note that there is a difference between restoration
and redistribution. Restoration is one type of redistributive program.
Restoration is a one-time event that occurs within a specified timeframe.
It is an attempt to correct past wrongs by returning to a prior status quo
perceived to be more just, or creating a new status quo predicated upon
correcting specific past wrongs. Redistribution is an ongoing process that
involves a transfer of wealth from the haves to the have-nots, thereby
creating a social safety net.98 Redistribution, however, results in a new
status quo not necessarily designed to correct past wrongs. Redistributive
programs and policies are the only practical alternative in situations
where inadequate records make it impossible to determine who is eligible
for restoration. 99
96. The legislature's role is especially important when interagency coordination is nec-
essary for the delivery of the assets, because either confusion or paralysis will abound if
implementing bureaucracies do not have a clear political mandate.
97. The best form of reparations will not always be in monetary form. See William
Bradford, Beyond Reparations: An American Indian Theory of Justice, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1,
6-7 (2005) (noting that "[nlon-monetary modes of redress may be more effective in induc-
ing the national government to accept moral responsibility, in restoring the dignity and
autonomy of injured groups, and in healing, reconstituting, and relegitimizing the nation");
Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom: Critical Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 323, 391 (1987) (noting that appropriate reparations might include
"[m]oney for education, housing, medical care, food, job training, cultural preservation,
recreation and other pressing needs of victim communities [that] will raise the standard of
living of victim groups, promoting their survival and participation").
98. For an intriguing view of redistribution, see Arthur Cockfield, Income Taxes and
Individual Liberty: A Lockean Perspective on Radical Consumption Tax Reform, 46 S.D. L.
REV. 8, 65 (2001) ("Redistribution of wealth and the accompanying high levels of taxation
also help to promote the view that all (or almost all) benefit from capitalist taxation sys-
tems; this is an important norm that continually needs to be communicated to citizens in
order to legitimize social institutions protecting private property. As such, payments to-
ward redistribution of wealth can be seen by the taxpayer as just another payment to the
state for protection of the security of the individual's person, the main goal of Lockean
private property.").
99. I purposefully use the word "impossible" as opposed to "difficult." It is always
difficult to sort out issues related to past violation of rights, but the restoration programs in
South Africa and Eastern Europe prove that it is not impossible. For example, a state must
decide how many years can pass before a dispossession claim is null and void. Once the
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The most important difference between restoration and redistribution
is that the former connects directly to a past violation of rights. Restora-
tion is largely protected from political vicissitudes and a claimant that
successfully traverses the established judicial or quasi-judicial process is
entitled to it. l ° ° Conversely, politics more profoundly affects redistribu-
tion. For instance, while one political administration acknowledged and
defended redistributive welfare programs, such as Affirmative Action,
because they ameliorate past wrongs, another denied the connection alto-
gether and cancelled the programs.' 0 ' Affirmative Action programs were
subject to cancellation because the beneficiaries did not have a right to
the benefits. In contrast, restoration restores a past legal right in prop-
erty and cannot be withdrawn without some judicial or quasi-judicial
review.
Depending on the context, redistribution may be more appropriate
than restoration. If a state decides to pursue restoration, it must happen
in conjunction with broad-based redistribution through the tax and trans-
fer system, which will address non-property related harms. Property-in-
duced invisibility historically coincides with other forms of oppression,
such as disappearance, execution, incarceration, torture, loss of employ-
ment, educational disruption, psychological scars, and/or sexual violence.
A society that appears to be prioritizing only the dispossession of prop-
erty over other forms of oppression and dehumanization will undoubt-
edly foment animosities among citizens.
A. THE IMPORTANCE AND LIMITS OF CHOICE
Although what makes us human is a complex convergence of factors, at
least one pronounced and critical thread in this multifaceted tapestry is
the ability to have and make simple choices that determine the trajectory
of one's life. 10 2 Dehumanization, which is a defining feature of property-
original victim has died, who inherits her claim? And what types of validating documents
are sufficient to honor a claim? These are all very context-specific questions that each
country must figure out for itself.
100. This is the case with affirmative action programs in the United States. See Alfred
L. Brophy, Some Conceptual and Legal Problems in Reparations for Slavery, 58 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURv. AM. L. 497, 499 (2003) (noting that "as [Affirmative Action] loses support in
legislatures, reparations offers the hope of a different language for talking about many of
the same issues").
101. See id. at 498-501.
102. Many of the most prominent philosophers have acknowledged the importance of
choice and autonomy. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971) (empha-
sizing that the principles of autonomy and choice require that individuals who act as repre-
sentatives for the larger population have one job: to choose principles of justice). The
works of Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and other social-contract theorists also emphasize the
importance of choice and autonomy because they premise their work on the fact that indi-
viduals choose to enter into a social contract with the state. See generally LOCKE, supra
note 33; THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (A. P. Martinich ed., Broadview Press 2002)
(1651); JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Maurice Cranston trans., Pen-
guin Books 1968) (1762); but cf. BENTHAM, supra note 11, at 72-74, 81-82. Nozick recog-
nizes choice as a defining feature of humanity and states that, "[a] person's shaping his life
in accordance with some overall plan is his way of giving meaning to his life; only a being
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induced invisibility, is based on the underlying notion that the subject
lacks a threshold level of capacity to fully participate in society. The es-
tablishment of choice-based remedies is predicated on the countervailing
assumption that a person does indeed have the capacity to navigate her
life and determine her actions. Restorative policies cannot afford to re-
main unduly rigid by failing to offer meaningful choices. Instead, these
policies must allow people to exercise their volition by choosing the mode
of restoration that best fits their idiosyncratic situation to the extent pos-
sible, and this will do a significant amount of work in restoring an invisi-
ble community or individual's relationship to society.
Nobel laureate, economist, and philosopher Amartya Sen argues that
freedom is integral to the foundations of justice; freedom entails having
the capability to make choices, which lead to outcomes that one has rea-
son to value.103 Sen's binary conception of freedom is not limited to a
procedural "freedom from" framework, which requires noninterference
with the exercise of one's agency.10 4 Rather, it also incorporates a "free-
dom to" element, which evaluates the substance of the choices made
available. 10 5 Sen's conception of freedom must permeate restoration pro-
grams, because it is critical for a society to allow invisible people to exer-
cise their agency by choosing how they are restored to full citizens, while
also ensuring that they have viable options from which to choose. 10 6 In
order for a dispossessed person or community to choose how they are
restored, the state and civil society must provide information and assis-
tance; also, the concept of choice suggests that there must be at least two
viable choices that a dispossessed person or community is willing to ac-
cept. It does not suggest a libertarian conception of choice, which as-
sumes "that all persons are the absolute owners of their own lives, and
should be free to do whatever they wish with their persons or property,
provided they allow others the same liberty. '' 10 7 Choice may be limited
in various ways.
There may be practical restraints to providing a full array of choices.
While cash distributions give communities and individuals maximum
choice, many nations, especially poor ones, must focus on in-kind options
because they do not have the ability to give cash payments without print-
ing additional money, thereby triggering inflation.10 8 In addition, due to
financial constraints, a nation may have to limit in-kind benefits to those
with the capacity tc so shape his life can have or strive for meaningful life." NozICK, supra
note 33, at 50.
103. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM 54-87 (1999).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. "[F]reedom is concerned with processes of decision making as well as opportu-
nities to achieve valued outcomes." Id. at 291.
107. See Libertarianism, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libertarianism (last visited Aug.
20, 2007). See generally Hillel Steiner, A Libertarian Quandary, 90 ETHics 257 (1980).
108. A cash payment may also be a more politically volatile option. If a government's
restorative agenda has a critical amount of opposition, then payoffs in the form of in-kind
services may be easier to sell to the public because the costs are less obvious.
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that have low marginal costs. 10 9 Beyond practical constraints on choice,
the state may restrict the choices given to dispossessed populations in
order to achieve the larger goal of legitimizing the property status quo.
For instance, the state should disallow cash payments if they do not in-
crease the well-being of recipients in the long-term, such that the legiti-
macy of property institutions is greatly increased.
Evidence suggests that some people who receive an unexpected wind-
fall of money, such as winning the lottery or receiving a large legal settle-
ment, will lose a significant portion of their wealth in a short period.110 In
South Africa it has been reported that "the unaccustomed windfall of
relatively large sums of money (from 17,500 rand upward) [through the
LRP] can be quickly dissipated in poor households, without producing
lasting material benefit or a sense of closure about the past."' ' This is
exactly what happened in St. Lucia, South Africa, which is a dispossessed
community of about a thousand households. 112 In this case, the land
commission determined that St. Lucia had a valid claim to land that is
now used for conservation purposes. Due to the present use of the
claimed land, the community was offered alternative land or financial
compensation, but the community was not given the option of crafting
their own remedy.'1 3 They opted for financial compensation. The Land
Claims Commission determined the present value of the claim and de-
cided that each household was entitled to R30,000 (approximately $5,000
U.S.). Due to the extreme poverty of the residents, most of the funds
were spent within six months with no notable improvement in the com-
munity's condition.114 There are now rumors that the community is con-
sidering retaking their ancestral land via land invasion, despite the fact
that they have already been paid.'1 5 Substantial quantities of money
have been expended by the government, but the legitimacy of property
arrangements is still under question. In these types of situations, South
Africa and other similarly situated states should give assets with less li-
quidity than cash, such as fixed assets, to prevent people from rapidly
109. For example, assume that providing subsidized credit costs $8000 and that tuition
for a government-funded vocational school is also $8000, but the government's marginal
cost of admitting one more student is $200. In this example, despite the fact that the access
to subsidized credit is important, providing free education is the type of in-kind option that
would be more practical for the government to offer.
110. See ROBERT WAGMAN, INSTANT MILLIONAIRES: CASHING IN ON AMERICA'S LOT-
TERIES 71-116 (1986); see also Ellen Goodstein, Eight Lottery Winners who Lost Their
Millions, MSN MONEY, http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/SavingandDebt/SaveMoney/
8lotteryWinnersWhoLostTheirMillions.aspx (last visited Aug. 20, 2007); Reversal of For-
tune (Showtime documentary broadcast Dec. 15, 2006) (experimenting by giving a home-
less man with no drug or mental problems $100,000 to see what he would do with the
money; within a short amount of time, he lost it all).
111. See Cherryl Walker, Misplaced Agrarianization? Reflections on Ten Years of Land
Restitution, 72 SOCIAL RESEARCH 647, 663 (2005).
112. Interview with Tozi Gwanya, Chief Land Claims Commissioner (SA), in Pretoria,






dissipating their new wealth due to short-term exigencies. If there is no
long-term improvement in one's welfare, the perceived legitimacy of land
arrangements will not be altered.
Choices should be restored at the level of the individual when the land
in question is individually owned, and at the communal level for com-
munally-owned land. For example, through a just and culturally relevant
process, a community can decide, among other things, that the harm was
intergenerational, such that one generation should not have the ability to
dissipate the assets received. 116 The group may decide that lands ac-
quired through the restoration process can be occupied, but may not be
sold without the approval of the group. Although restraints on alienation
will truncate each individual beneficiary's spectrum of choices, these re-
straints are a tool to ensure respect of the collective choice, which will
move the community towards visibility. The outvoted members of the
group, however, may remain invisible, and this is particularly problematic
if they are a historically marginalized sub-group. In order to ensure that
sub-groups do not remain invisible, restoration programs must allow peo-
ple to opt out of the group and receive their pro rata share, so that if
people feel that they are being ignored or marginalized, they can choose
to either exit or remain part of the group and advocate for change from
within. 17
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF ASSET OWNERSHIP
Restoring a community or individual's relationship to society is a com-
plex process that requires a considerable amount of private healing and
reconciliation that must take place outside of the government's purview.
Beyond these private acts, the restorative process can also include public
measures, such as public apologies, truth commissions, and public monu-
ments. These public measures can help to restore lost dignity, but cannot
adequately address property-induced invisibility. Property-induced invis-
ibility entails economic vulnerability, such that one is dependent on the
state for basic needs, so restoration of assets must be a central element in
any reversal strategy.
When property is confiscated in such a way that property-induced in-
visibility occurs, wealth is decimated, and this deficit is transferred in-
tergenerationally until there is an opportunity for a family, community, or
individual to re-accumulate the assets stolen and re-establish itself eco-
116. This is exactly what happened to Native American Tribes with the General Allot-
ment Act of 1887, a federal statute that allotted tribally-owned lands to individuals. The
gains from the sales were often quickly dissipated, leaving individuals in abject poverty and
tribes with significantly less land. Congress stopped the allotment of tribal lands via the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA) after tribes lost over 90 million acres of land to
white settlers. Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1, 7-16
(1995).
117. See generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO
DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
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nomically.118 Property-induced invisibility will persist for generations if
people are not able to rebound economically from the initial confisca-
tion. 119 Asset transfers will afford people the opportunity to re-build
their wealth and move beyond their economic dependence on the state
for basic needs.
Also, given that exclusion is a defining feature of property-induced in-
visibility, assets are crucial because they promote economic and political
inclusion. On the political front, assets increase poor people's stakehold-
ing and thereby, their investment and participation in the democratic pro-
cess. This is demonstrated, in part, by the fact that, controlling for
relevant factors, property owners vote more often than non-property
owners. 120 Asset ownership can also help to overcome barriers that pre-
vent people from being more involved in the democratic process, such as
lack of time and economic dependence.' 21 Economically, by providing
people with capital that they can leverage for productive investments, as-
118. See MELVIN L. OLIVER & THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTHIWHITE
WEALTH: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY 5-6 (1995) ("Just as blacks have
had 'cumulative disadvantages,' many whites have had 'cumulative advantages.' Since
wealth builds over a lifetime and is then passed along to kin, it is, from our perspective, an
essential indicator of black economic well-being. By focusing on wealth we discover how
black's socioeconomic status results from a socially layered accumulation of disadvantages
passed on from generation to generation."). See generally JOHN A. BRIrTAIN, THE INHERI-
TANCE OF ECONOMIC STATUS (1977).
119. Intergenerational justice, also commonly known as intergenerational equity, is the
idea that present generations bear some moral obligation toward past and future genera-
tions. See George Sher, Ancient Wrongs and Modern Rights, in JUSTICE BETWEEN AGE
GROUPS AND GENERATIONS 48, 59 (Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin eds., Yale Univ. Press
1992) (distinguishing between "ancient" wrongs, which "call for no significant amounts of
compensation," and "the vast intermediate class of wrongs ... committed one or more
generations ago," which "do call for some compensation"); Hanoch Dagan, Restoration
and Slavery: On Incomplete Commodification, Intergenerational Justice, and Legal Transi-
tions, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1139, 1162 (2004) (arguing for the "descendibility of wrongful en-
slavement claims"); Lawrence B. Solum, To Our Children's Children's Children: The
Problems of Intergenerational Ethics, 35 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 163, 174 (2001).
120. See Bernadette Atuahene, Land Titling: A Mode of Privatization with the Potential
to Deepen Democracy, 50 ST. Louis U. L.J. 761, 775-77 (2006). Those with no property, in
theory, also have a strong incentive to participate in the lawmaking process because they
are reliant on government largess and should hence want a voice in how it is distributed.
In reality, though, poor people are less likely to vote than those with property. See JEN-
NIFER DAY & KELLY HOLDER, VOTING AND REGISTRATION IN THE ELECTION OF NOVEM-
BER 2002: POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 8 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2004).
121. Atuahene, supra note 120, at 775-77 (arguing economic dependence can lead to a
compromised ability to exercise one's political rights and thereby prevent people from fully
participating in democratic institutions). For example, during the Civil Right Movement,
black sharecroppers often could not exercise their constitutional right to vote because
landowners threatened to evict them from the land if they did. The sharecroppers' eco-
nomic dependence lead to a lack of political independence. Property ownership can afford
an individual a measure of economic and thereby political independence. Id. at 771-72.
See also BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 185 (1999)
(arguing that although democratic participation requires time, the financial security that
flows from property ownership, gives the stakeholder time to participate: "[M]odern
stakeholding will create a certain space for civic reflection in millions of lives now domi-
nated by economic anxiety. Fewer Americans will be living on the economic edge; stake-




sets allow those once excluded from effectively participating in the capi-
talist economy to participate.1 22
Lastly, assets have the power to increase the long-term well-being of
invisible communities and individuals, which is crucial for increasing the
legitimacy of the property status quo. Michael Sherraden convincingly
argues that assets have several general welfare effects. 12 3 They improve
economic and household stability, 2 4 create an orientation toward the fu-
ture,125 stimulate development of human and other capital,126 enable
people to focus and specialize, 127 provide a foundation for risk-taking, 128
yield personal social and political dividends, 129 and enhance the welfare
of offspring. 130
IV. CASE STUDY: MOVING FROM REPARATION TO
RESTORATION IN SOUTH AFRICA'S LAND
RESTITUTION PROGRAM
History reveals numerous incidences in which property was confiscated
in such a manner that individuals and communities were removed from
the social contract and thus rendered invisible. There is, however, a pau-
city of cases in which governments have taken action to correct past ex-
propriation of property rights. 131 South Africa is one of them. More
significantly, South Africa's land policy states that it is committed to a
122. See HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRI-
UMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000); see also, Atuahene, supra note
120; Bernadette Atuahene, Legal Title to Land as an Intervention Against Urban Poverty in
Developing Nations, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1109, 1116-18 (2004).
123. MICHAEL SHERRADEN, ASSETS AND THE POOR: A NEW AMERICAN WELFARE
POLICY 148 (1991).
124. Assets do this by serving as a bulwark against income shocks and thereby maintain
a family's social and economic health until income flows recommence. "[B]ecause eco-
nomic worries are a major contributor to a cluster of psychological and social problems
associated with unemployment, the family is also more likely to bear the wounds of mental
depression, rage, marital breakup, child and spouse abuse, alcohol and drug use, and so
forth." Id. at 149.
125. Assets give people a larger stake in the future. Also, asset management requires
long term thinking and planning. Id. at 151.
126. For example, for many Americans, home ownership is the most common way to
build wealth. Through homeownership, people have an incentive to learn about real estate
markets and capital investments generally. They also have an incentive to acquire home
improvement skills. Id. at 156-57.
127. Id. at 158-59 ("In poor households, people spend their time in a wide diversity of
tasks because they do not have sufficient assets to enable greater focus and specializa-
tion.... Many people forego opportunities for specialized education and training because
they have to feed their families.").
128. High risks bring high rewards, but many people are not in a position to take risks
because they have nothing to fall back on. Assets provide the security that places people
in a position to take social or psychological risks. Id. at 159-60.
129. Assets allow greater strength, control, and security. They provide greater power in
social and economic negotiations. In addition, with assets, people have a higher incentive
and greater resources to participate in the political process. Id. at 161-67.
130. Id. at 166 ("[A]ssets also increase the welfare of offspring. Assets provide an in-
tergenerational connection that income and consumption cannot provide.").
131. See generally WHEN SORRY ISN'T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER APOLOGIES
AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN INJUSTICE (Roy Brooks ed., 1999).
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program that moves beyond the limited emphasis on return of property,
and is invested in the larger project of restoring invisible peoples' rela-
tionships to society.132 As such, the country ideally serves to further ex-
plore the conceptions of property-induced invisibility and restoration
developed in this Article.
A. PROPERTY-INDUCED INVISIBILITY IN SOUTH AFRICA
1. Historical Context of Property-Induced Invisibility
Upon their arrival in 1652, Europeans were able to assume a dominant
position in southern Africa through their superior weaponry and warfare
strategies. 133 From the time of their arrival until the demise of Apartheid
in 1994, Europeans and their descendants leveraged their dominance and
unilaterally set the terms of the social contract. Based on the white su-
premacist notion that all non-whites belonged to ontologically inferior,
savage races, non-whites were dehumanized and explicitly excluded from
the social contract. Consequently, South Africa is a country that has high
levels of property-induced invisibility. That is, the white supremacist
state systematically confiscated land from Blacks with no payment of just
compensation, and this land dispossession was part of a larger strategy of
dehumanization, which left the majority of Blacks powerless, poor, and
dependent on the state to satisfy their basic needs. 134
Land dispossession in South Africa was executed, in part, within a legal
framework that began with the 1913 Native Land Act, which constrained
Black land rights by prohibiting them from buying or leasing land from
whites who lived outside of areas where Black land ownership was al-
lowed. 135 After the Native Land Act came two legal proclamations that
further infringed upon Black land rights. The Native Administration Act
of 1927 gave the Governor-General plenary power to "order the removal
of any tribe or portion thereof or any Native from any place to any other
place within the Union upon such conditions as he may determine."'1 36
The Development Trust and Land Act of 1936 vested title to all native
reserves in a trust rather than to Blacks. 137 Black land loss was further
entrenched when the National Party came to power in 1948 and intro-
duced a system of separate development called Apartheid. Apartheid le-
gally mandated that whites live apart from Blacks and systematically
divided Blacks into homelands, or Bantustans, according to ethnicity. 138
132. The government has declared that freedom and agency are indispensable elements
of the restorative process. See DEPARTMENT OF LAND AFFAIRS, WHITE PAPER ON SOUTH
AFRICAN LAND POLICY § 2.1 (1997) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER].
133. See DEPARTMENT OF LAND AFFAIRS, OUR LAND: THE GREEN PAPER ON SOUTH
AFRICAN LAND POLICY 37 (1996) [hereinafter GREEN PAPER].
134. For the definition of property induced invisibility, see infra Part II and accompany-
ing discussion.
135. See GREEN PAPER, supra note 133, at 37.
136. PLATZKY & WALKER, supra note 59, at 88.
137. Id. at 89.
138. See Thoko Didiza, Minister for Agric. & Land Affairs, The Importance of a Suc-
cessful Land Reform Programme in South Africa, Opening Address at the National Land
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In order to more thoroughly institutionalize the separate development
policy, the 1950 Group Areas Act and the Black Resettlement Act of
1954 were passed, which both sought to eradicate "black spots" in urban
areas. 139 Blacks who owned property in areas newly declared as white
were forcibly removed. 140 The 1964 Bantu Laws Amendment Act inten-
sified Black land loss by giving the government legal license to remove
Africans from any town or white farming area at any time. 141 All of these
laws were part of the legal architecture intended to sequester Blacks in
the homelands and deprive them of any possibility of acquiring or sus-
taining rights in land.
In addition to the scores of individuals and communities who were dis-
possessed before 1960, "[t]he Surplus People Project ... estimated that
3,548,900 people were removed between 1960 and 1983: 1,702,400 from
the towns, 1,129,000 from farms, 614,000 from black spots, and 103,500
from strategic and developmental areas.' 142 Property-induced invisibility
will persist for those dispossessed Blacks and their descendants who have
been unable to recover from the original theft and thus remain economi-
cally vulnerable without land or other assets.
As a result of continuous legal land dispossession, whites who consti-
tuted less than ten percent of the population upon independence in 1994
owned eighty-seven percent of the country's land, while Blacks owned a
mere thirteen percent.143 Because there has been no significant transfor-
mation of property arrangements since liberation, the perception com-
monly held by the Black majority is that the status quo of property
ownership is illegitimate because the racially imbalanced property distri-
bution is a direct result of past colonial and Apartheid-era theft. Before
any commitment to significant protection for private property can gain
widespread purchase among the Black majority, something must be done
to assuage the profound sense of illegitimacy that pervades perceptions of
present land arrangements. If nothing is done, then one can expect the
present disregard for property rights to continue.
2. Consequences of Property-Induced Invisibility
Nationally, sixty-eight percent of crimes are property-related. 144 In the
Tenure Conference (Nov 26, 2001), available at http/H:www.info.gov.za/speeches/2001/0111
28946a1002.htm. The homelands were purportedly self-governing, but in reality, traditional
chiefs were hand picked by the Apartheid government to rule the Bantustans and were
given power that far exceeded their traditional authority. See also GREEN PAPER, supra
note 133, at 9.
139. See Didiza, supra note 138.
140. See LEONARD THOMPSON, A HISTORY OF SouTH AFRICA 194 (3d ed. 1995). Two
of the most infamous forced removals were in Sophiatown and District Six. Id.
141. Id. at 199.
142. Id. at 194.
143. Daniel Owen, Land Reform-Running Out of Time, THE PROGRESSIVE REP.,
http://www.progress.org/land16.html (last visited Sept. 22, 2007).
144. The most common types of property-related crimes are "burglary at a residential
premises," "theft out of or from a motor vehicle," and "malicious damage to property."
CRIME INFO. ANALYSIS CTR., S. AFR. POLICE SERV., CRIME STATISTICS FOR SouTH AF-
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country's urban centers, electric fences, private security guards, high se-
curity walls, and alarm systems are the norm because of the high theft
rates. 145
Also, land invasions are on the rise. Upon independence in 1994,
grassroots groups organized around the constitutional mandate to resti-
tute and redistribute land. The government, thus far, has not been able to
make the constitutional mandate a reality, so many of these groups are
now beginning to employ extra-legal strategies to achieve land equity.
For instance, organizations such as the Landless People's Movement
("LPM") organize communities to reclaim land through illegal occupa-
tion.146 Founded in 2002, the LPM claims upwards of 100,000 mem-
bers.147 In the eyes of the poor landless masses in South Africa, the LPM
has the moral high ground, though it advocates illegal actions, because it
is somewhat akin to the United States civil rights organizations that en-
gaged in illegal sit-ins during the 1960s. 148 Sit-ins violated the illegitimate
but legal architecture of segregation, just as land invasions violate prop-
erty laws that uphold a distribution of property widely perceived to be
illegitimate.
In the face of increasing land invasions and high property-theft rates,
the obvious question becomes whether South Africa will end up in chaos
like Zimbabwe. After all, the unequal, illegitimate distribution of land in
Zimbabwe was one major impetus behind the war veteran occupation of
white farms and ensuing chaos that erupted in 2002.149 The little known
fact, however, is that there has been more farm-related violence in South
Africa than in Zimbabwe. 150 South Africa's commitment to the rule of
law is the only thing preventing a reproduction of the Zimbabwe crisis. 151
In sum, there is a backlash against markets in South Africa in the form
of disdain for property rights. This should not be surprising, given the
RICA (1994/1995 to 2003/2004), available at http://www.capegateway.gov.za/eng/pubs/public
_info/C/86878/1.
145. Statistics show that a murder was committed every half hour, so there is no mys-
tery as to why people live in fear. See CRIME SHOWDOWN IN THE WILD SOUTH, Guy
ARNOLD, THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA 83 (2000).
146. The LPM demands "an end to evictions, whether on farms or-in informal and
other settlements, and a process of transferring land to those residing and working on it.
The movement has targeted land occupations as one method of redistributing land through
the self-activity of the landless, and has identified unproductive, unused or underused land
and land belonging to abusive farmers as the focus for initial redistribution." See STEPHEN
GREENBERG, THE LANDLESS PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT AND THE FAILURE OF POST-
APARTHEID LAND REFORM 2 (Ctr. for Civil Soc'y Research Report No. 25, Dec. 2004).
147. Id. The LPM is the South African counterpart to the Brazilian movement called
the Landless Rural Workers' Movement (Movimento dos Trabhaladores Rurais Sem
Terra). Id. at 5-6.
148. Its membership increases in accordance with the level of dissatisfaction with the
LRP. Interview with Andile Mngxitama, Land Activist and leader in the Landless Peo-
ple's Movement, in Pretoria, S. Afr. (Sept. 19, 2006).
149. See MOORE, supra note 13, at 320.
150. See More Squeeze than Grab, Land Reform in South Africa: Don't Expect





high rate of invisibility, especially property-induced invisibility, that per-
sists in the country. To end this backlash against property rights, the gov-
ernment must work to instill a sense of legitimacy in present property
arrangements through restoration. In their article about countries in
transition, Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule have noted that "[w]hen
historical property rights have more legitimacy than the distribution ex-
isting at the time of transition, restitution programs channel claims into
the legal system that might otherwise destabilize the market by posing a
political threat to the security of post-transitional property rights." 152 If
nothing is done to address the ongoing effects of past theft in South Af-
rica, then political unrest will reign supreme.1 53 The Land Restitution
Program ("LRP") is South Africa's attempt to address past theft.
B. REFORMING THE LAND RESTITUTION PROGRAM
1. The Land Restitution Program and its Challenges
Under the LRP, only those dispossessed of a right in land after 1913
will receive compensation.1 54 This particular date was chosen for several
reasons. First, although Black land dispossession began prior to 1913,
152. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice, 117
HARV. L. REV. 761, 789 (2004).
153. "Despite recent political improvements, South Africa is still in danger of wide-
spread unrest brought on by the continued presence of economic inequality along racial
lines" Schneider, supra note 12, at 24.
154. (1) A person shall be entitled to restoration of a right in land if-
(a) he or she is a person dispossessed of a right in land after 19 June
1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices; or
(b) it is a deceased estate dispossessed of a right in land after 19 June
1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices; or
(c) he or she is the direct descendant of a person referred to in para-
graph (a) who has died without lodging a claim and has no ascen-
dant who-
(i) is a direct descendant of a person referred to in paragraph (a);
and
(ii) has lodged a claim for the restoration of a right in land; or
(d) it is a community or part of a community dispossessed of a right in
land after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory
laws or practices; and
(e) the claim for such restoration is lodged no later than 31 December
1998.
(2) No person shall be entitled to restoration of a right in land if-
(a) just and equitable compensation as contemplated in section 25 (3) of
the Constitution; or
(b) any other consideration which is just and equitable, calculated at the
time of any dispossession of such right, was received in respect of
such dispossession.
(3) If a natural person dies after lodging a claim but before the claim is and-
(a) leaves a will by which the right or equitable redress claimed has been
disposed of, the executor of the deceased estate, in his or her capac-
ity as the representative of the estate, alone or, failing the executor,
the heirs of the deceased alone; or
(b) does not leave a will contemplated in paragraph (a), the direct de-
scendants alone, may be substituted as claimant or claimants.
(4) If there is more than one direct descendant who have lodged claims for
and are entitled to restoration, the right or equitable redress in question
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South Africa was not one country until after the Boer War in 1910. Thus,
the 1913 law was the first major piece of legislation that allowed the
newly formed South African state to legally dispossess Blacks of their
land. 155 Second, the absence of written records, coupled with the passage
of time, makes it extremely difficult to verify claims of dispossession
before 1913.156 Third, "most deep historical claims are justified on the
basis of membership in a tribal kingdom or chiefdom. The entertainment
of such claims would serve to awaken and/or prolong destructive ethnic
and racial politics."'1 57 Fourth, "the members of ethnically defined com-
munities and chiefdoms and their present descendants have increased
more than eight times in this century alone and are scattered."' 158 Fifth,
"large parts of South Africa could be subject to overlapping and compet-
ing claims where pieces of land have been occupied in succession by, for
example, the San, Khoi, Xhosa, Mfengu, Trekkers and British."1 59 As a
result of these complications, compensation is provided for dispossession
that occurred because of the Native Land Act and subsequent laws.
The LRP has several challenges. First is the issue of landowners who
currently have valid title to property that was stolen in the past but are
not implicated in the original theft. While this buyer in due course has a
valid expectation to maintain her land, there are other valid, competing
expectations at play-namely, the expectation that when something is il-
legally or immorally expropriated, it should be returned.1 60 Under no
circumstance is the uncompensated taking of land from an innocent
buyer in due course justified.16t Nevertheless, the taking of land using
the state's powers of eminent domain is a valid mechanism for restructur-
ing property arrangements to increase their legitimacy in society. There
shall be divided not according to the number of individuals but by lines
of succession.
Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act of 1999 § 2(1) [hereinafter the
"LRA"].
155. The Afrikaner government immediately passed laws that gave Africans the right to
own land only if it was located in areas designated as native reserves. The government
then confiscated land from blacks who occupied property outside of the reserves and trans-
ferred it to white farmers so that many black landowners were transformed into employees





160. Bentham is the most famous for characterizing property as a basis of expectation:
"Property is nothing but a basis of expectation; the expectation of deriving certain advan-
tages from a thing which we are said to possess, in consequence of the relation in which we
stand towards it." BENTHAM, supra note 11, 111-12.
161. When there is a taking, the majority of states agree that some form of compensa-
tion is due. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 509 (6th ed.
2003) (Under international law "[a] considerable number of states insist that expropriation
can only take place on payment of adequate, effective compensation. In practice deferred
payments are regarded as sufficient provided effective compensation takes place. The re-
quirement of promptness has become subordinated to the other conditions and also to
economic realities relating to payment of large sums .... The majority of states accept the
principle of compensation, but not on the basis of the 'prompt, adequate, and effective
formula."') (internal citations omitted).
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is extensive literature concerning the virtues and vices of land reform,
which reveals that restructuring the property status quo using the powers
of eminent domain can increase efficiency, promote equality, and buttress
democracy.1 62
A second common critique is that restoration programs that allow res-
titution (return of the actual parcel of land stolen in the past) are ineffi-
cient because they unsettle property rights by introducing an
unacceptably high degree of uncertainty over ownership rights. This is
not necessarily true. Restitution done in an orderly and efficient manner
causes no more uncertainty than accepted and routine features of mature
capitalist economies, such as adverse possession, unrecorded security in-
terests, uncompensated regulatory takings, inadequately compensated or-
dinary takings, increases in property taxes, and government regulation. 163
There is no doubt that during the time between the beginning and end of
the claim-filing period, property rights will be uncertain. Once this pe-
riod is over, "[i]f all claims are immediately recognized and announced to
the world, then both losers and winners will know the extent of their ex-
isting property rights, and they will invest and trade accordingly."'' 64
A third issue raised is the notion that restoration requires one to make
morally arbitrary distinctions that have potentially life changing conse-
quences and hence, the distinctions are unjust. For instance, choosing
who will benefit and what violations are covered in the LRP involves
morally arbitrary distinctions that have changed the course of many
lives. 165 Only those who were dispossessed of a "right in land or portion
of land dispossessed after 19 June 1913 as a result of past racially discrimi-
natory laws or practices" are eligible to participate in the LRP.166 On
what moral basis are those dispossessed the day before (on June 18, 1913),
162. See generally RUSSELL KING, LAND REFORM: A WORLD SURVEY (1977); Roy L.
PROSTERMAN & JEFFREY M. RIEDINGER, LAND REFORM AND DEMOCRATIC DEVELOP-
MENT (1987); Timothy Besley & Robin Burgess, Land Reform, Poverty Reduction, and
Growth: Evidence from India, 115 Q. J. ECON. 389 (2000); Eduardo Flores, Issues of Land
Reform, 78 J. POL. ECON. 890 (1970); Moene, supra note 90.
163. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 152, at 785-86.
164. Id. at 785.
165. See infra note 171. Hungary's program makes morally arbitrary distinctions. In
Hungary, the restitution program extends to foreign citizens and residents so long as: (1)
they were Hungarian citizens at the time of the taking; (2) it was the taking that caused
them to lose their status as a Hungarian citizen; or (3) they were residents in Hungary as of
December 31, 1990. Stolen land, stolen personal property, and shares in expropriated
companies may all be restituted in Hungary. The restitution program allows claims from
both communist expropriations that occurred after June 8, 1949, and antisemetic confisca-
tions that occurred between May 1, 1939, and the first Communist Parliament in June 8,
1949. All other expropriations are not covered. See Andris Ossk6, Land Restitution and
Compensation Procedures in Central Eastern Europe, OICRF, Nov. 19, 2002, available at
http://www.oicrf.org; Istvan Pogany, The Restitution of Former Jewish-owned Property and
Related Schemes of Compensation in Hungary, 4 EUR. PUB. L. No. 2, 211, 215 (1998). For
information about the compensation program for East Germany and the morally arbitrary
distinctions made there see, for example, Jessica Heslop & Joel Roberto, Property Rights in
the Unified Germany: A Constitutional, Comparative, and International Legal Analysis, 11
B.U. INT'L. L.J. 243, 288 (1993); Frank, supra note 63, at 809, 833; William Karl Wilburn,
Filing of U.S. Property Claims in Eastern Germany, 25 INT'L LAW. 649, 656 (1991).
166. See the LRA, supra note 154.
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or even earlier, left out? By what moral standard is compensation of-
fered for property dispossession rather than other injustices that occurred
under Apartheid such as death, torture, or loss of employment?
The fact that a state cannot compensate everyone is not a valid reason
for it not to compensate anyone. The best cannot be the enemy of the
good. 167 In addition, morally arbitrary distinctions are made all the time
with regard to compensation. For example, United States takings law is
replete with morally arbitrary distinctions. For example, regardless of the
size of the invasion, a physical occupation of property is a per se taking,
while a regulation that does not allow one to transform their property
and thus decreases its potential value is not a taking. 168 There is a high
degree of moral arbitrariness in this distinction.
A fourth critique makes the case that the selection of beneficiaries for
the LRP may cause serious divisions among citizens. There may be ten-
sion between beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries. Although there may be
some short-term social tension, research shows that efforts to change an
illegitimate status quo have the potential to reduce rather than inflame
social strife in the long-term. 169 It is important to note that in many
cases, the illegitimate property ownership status quo is what foments so-
cial animosities.
Fifth, critics may argue that the LRP is not necessary because the mar-
ket will efficiently allocate resources such that those who value them the
most will purchase them, 170 and thus, government intervention through
the LRP is not necessary. Also, the LRP is subject to bureaucratic ineffi-
ciency, such as rent seeking in the selection of beneficiaries and the distri-
bution of goods. For the foregoing reasons, critics may argue that the
LRP is per se inefficient as compared to a strictly market-based solution.
This is untrue because, as Polishchuk argues, "if private property rights
are not sufficiently broadly recognized in the society as legitimate and
fair, it makes the property rights regime unstable. This instability pre-
cludes efficient relocation of assets, and as a result, expected efficiency
gains of private ownership fail to materialize.' 17 1 In South Africa, prop-
erty arrangements are widely perceived to be illegitimate due to perva-
sive past theft. The only way to change this perception is by transforming
the property status quo. This will only happen with government interven-
tion, because a market-driven process would favor those with resources
while excluding the economically vulnerable masses from receiving
property.
167. For a contrary argument, see John Elster, On Doing What One Can: An Argument
Against Post-Communist Restitution and Retribution, E. EUR. CONST. REV., Summer 1992,
at 15, 15.
168. Compare Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 425
(1982), with Penn Central Transp. Co. v. N.Y. City, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978).
169. See supra note 90.
170. See generally Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Costs, 3 J. L. & EcoN. 1 (1960)
(theorizing that if there are zero transaction costs, the efficient outcome will occur regard-
less of legal entitlement because those who value the resource most will purchase it).
171. Polishchuk, supra note 85, at 5.
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Polishchuk further argues that "[c]redibility of existing property rights
is .. .critically important for efficient deployment of privately owned
resources.' 1 72 Without credibility, present owners will use resources to
protect their property from extralegal expropriation rather than investing
them efficiently, and trade will be suppressed.173 One critical source of
the lack of credibility, widespread property-induced invisibility, would be
untouched without government involvement.
Sixth, critics may claim that the LRP is faced with insurmountable bar-
riers that exist because different property systems from different eras
must be taken into consideration. In South Africa, European settlers and
indigenous Africans have had fundamentally different conceptions of
ownership. At the point of expropriation, African norms were dominant,
so people had occupancy and cultivation rights allocated by traditional
leaders, which were based on need and availability.1 7 4 At the point of
compensation through the LRP, however, individuals and communities
are given title to land in fee simple, because the prevailing norm is the
European notion of ownership. 175 What was taken and what is being re-
stored are two different things.
Under my conception of restoration, there is no challenge presented by
the fact that the thing taken and the thing restored are different, and in
fact, my emphasis on choice encourages this. If a person was dispos-
sessed of a tract of land, the solution is not necessarily to give her that
tract of land back, but instead to give her choices as to what kind of asset
she wants. The goal is to place her in the driver's seat, because this is how
a society can begin the process of reconciling an invisible person's rela-
tionship to society.
A seventh critique is that past wrongs should not feature prominently
in a new social contract because efforts to redress wrongdoing that oc-
curred under an invalid and presently defunct contract can undermine the
new regime. While South African society can enter a new social contract,
it does not start at ground zero. There are certain institutions, processes,
and status quos established by previous contracts that a society inherits
and brings into the new one. 176 Only if the new political dispensation's
break from the past is credible can its new beginning be credible. The
South African government's commitment to restoration sends a message
172. Id.; see also William H. Riker & David L. Weimer, The Political Economy of
Transformation, in MODERN POLITICAL ECONOMY: OLD Topics, NEW DIRECTIONS 80, 94
(Jeffrey S. Banks & Eric A. Hanushek eds., 1995).
173. Polishchuk, supra note 85, at 9.
174. See THOMPSON, supra note 140, at 163; Heinz Klug, Defining the Property Rights
of Others: Political Power, Indigenous Tenure and the Construction of Customary Land
Law, 35 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 119, 119-21 (1996).
175. See generally Klug, supra note 174.
176. The South African government clearly recognizes the connection between past in-
justices and the new social contract. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 132 § 3.17.3 ("Consid-
ering the fact that more than 3.5 million people and their descendants have been victims of
racially based dispossession and forced removal during the apartheid era, it is clear that a
mammoth responsibility rests on the shoulders of the state to give effect to restitution of
land rights.").
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that it is committed to protecting everyone's property (both white and
Black), and this commitment is a credible signal that the new regime has
done away with the old social contract, which prioritized the rights of
whites.
Eighth, critics may also suggest that changed circumstances can void an
individual or community's claim to restoration. 77 This argument sug-
gests that we do not know what would have happened to property but for
the original theft. The individual may have lost the property due to a
natural disaster or bad investments, or alternatively, she might have
doubled the value of her asset. Thus, the goal of restoration cannot be to
restore a victim to the state she would have been in today but for the act.
This would merely be an exercise in conjecture with no basis in fact be-
cause it is impossible to know exactly how history would be altered. 178
Jeremy Waldron argues that:
The idea is that titles and jurisdictions unjustly appropriated in the
mid-nineteenth century might simply revert now to their original
possessors, who would then set the terms (or participate from a privi-
leged position in setting the terms) on which the resources in ques-
tion would continue to be used by present-day inhabitants of the
territory. And this, it is suggested, is not by way of compensation or
reparation of injustices that began and ended in the past, but, rather,
as a way of putting a stop to ongoing injustice and restoring resource
and power to those who have continued all along to be entitled to
them. Such a reversionary proposal evidently assumes that those
who were entitled to the resources just before the injustice com-
plained of began, say, in 1850 would-apart from that injustice-still
have been entitled to them in 2003. And that is what the supersession
argument contests in denying that justice is impervious to changes in
circumstances. It is a way of showing that, in certain sequences of
circumstances, dispossession may not continue to count as an injus-
tice even though the events that led to it undoubtedly were an injus-
tice. And if the dispossession does not continue to count as an
injustice, then reversion cannot be conceived as an appropriate
177. Jeremy Waldron, Settlement, Return, and the Supersession Thesis, 5 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 237, 240 (2004).
178. The present standard is to restore a victim to the state she would have been in but
for the act. "The essence of the law of restitution is that it enables a plaintiff to be restored
to the position which he or she occupied before the occurrence of a particular event, where
that event is of a type which triggers a restitutionary response." Graham Virgo, What is the
Law of Restitution About?, in RESTITUTION PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE - (Cornish et
al. eds., 1998). See also Factory at Chorz6w (F.R.G. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17,
at 47 (Sept. 13) ("The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act- a
principle which seems to be established by international practice and in particular by the
decisions of arbitral tribunals- is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation which would, in all
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed."). Waldron thinks that the
present standard is an untenable counterfactual. See Jeremy Waldron, Redressing Historic
Injustice, 52 UNIv. TORONTO L.J. 135, 144 (2002) ("How can we know what would have
happened if some event that in fact did occur had not taken place?"); Jeremy Waldron,




Waldron is correct, and an. attempt to reverse past theft might very well
be an injustice to current inhabitants if, as he points out, restoration
means current inhabitants will starve or be subject to repugnant inequali-
ties.18 0 Justice may require the children of the dispossessed share the
land with the daughters and sons of those who unjustly expropriated it, or
with newcomers, who may have had nothing to do with the past wrong.
Nonetheless, the dispossessed are still owed compensation for past in-
justice, insofar as it does not have debilitating consequences for current
owners. The correct conceptual framework for restoration is that of un-
paid debt obligations, which are inheritable. 181 The debt includes two
aspects-which are assets and the agency that comes with owning as-
sets-so justice requires that assets and agency be restored. Restoration
does just this, by giving the dispossessed asset-based choices.
Ninth, in addition to the problem of changed circumstances, the pas-
sage of time presents other barriers to the LRP. For instance, property
may have been dispossessed from an individual, who is now deceased, or
a community, whose members are now difficult to identify, evidence of
ownership may be depleted or nonexistent, and the present value of the
property stolen may be difficult to determine. The LRP, as well as com-
pensation programs in Germany, Hungary, and beyond, prove that these
challenges are significant but not insurmountable.
182
In South Africa, for example, if the entitled individual is dead, then the
LRP allows for the direct descendants or the deceased's estate to receive
compensation. Various forms of evidence are accepted to prove that an
individual was part of a community or that she had a right to a particular
piece of land. These include anthropological evidence, evidence from the
national archives, graves and ruins that prove occupation by a certain in-
dividual or family, and site visits where claimants testify as to exactly
where they used to reside, and this testimony is compared to the testi-
mony of neighbors.'8 3 In terms of valuation, the Land Claims Court de-
cided that the market value at the time of dispossession would be the
starting point, which could be adjusted according to factors set out in sec-
tion 25(3) of the Constitution; 184 all market-value assessments are deter-
mined by an independent assessor.1 8 5
179. Waldron, supra note 178, at 244-45 (emphasis added).
180. This is one example Waldron gives to explain why it is the case that "in certain
sequences of circumstances, dispossession may not continue to count as an injustice even
though the events that led to it undoubtedly were an injustice." Id.
181. For more about the inheritance argument, see generally Bernard Boxill, A Lock-
ean Argument for Black Reparations, 7 J. ETHics 63 (2003).
182. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
183. Interview with Maureen Tong, Chief Operations Officer of Housing Department
(SA), in Capetown, S. Afr. (Sept. 13, 2006).
184. See Former Highlands Residents: Ex parte In re Ash v. Dep't of Land Affairs 2000
(Zall) 5A (LCC) (S. Afr.).
185. Id.
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Lastly, one may argue that the LRP resurrects a past status quo, which
can be non-egalitarian or illegitimate. However, restoration requires that
the past status quo, or the new one created based on past rights, be signif-
icantly more legitimate than the present one. Due to the intensification
of law-based, racially discriminatory land dispossession after 1913, the
pre-1913 property status quo-although not perfect-is widely thought to
be more legitimate than the one that existed at independence in 1994.186
In order to increase the perceived legitimacy of land arrangements result-
ing from the LRP, the government decided to treat women and men
equally in the restoration program, 187 despite patriarchal land traditions
that existed during the period eligible for compensation (1913-94).
2. Who Should Benefit from the Land Restitution Program?
I have argued that a state committed to restoring past rights in land
must, as a baseline, address property-induced invisibility. Addressing
property-induced invisibility requires the state to prioritize those who, as
a result of past theft, are presently economically vulnerable and depen-
dent on the state for their most basic needs. South Africa has committed
a substantial amount of resources to its LRP, and thus has been able to
include a wide swath of people in the program, including those who were
economically vulnerable at the time of confiscation, those who are still
economically vulnerable, and those who were never made economically
vulnerable as a consequence of the confiscation. Consequently, the base-
line has been exceeded because there are resources available for those
who were subject to property-induced invisibility and those who were
not.
South Africa's expansive definition of a right in land is how it managed
to ensure that a wide population benefits from its LRP. A right in land is
any right in land whether registered or unregistered, and may include
the interest of a labour tenant and sharecropper, a customary law
interest, the interest of a beneficiary under a trust arrangement and
beneficial occupation for a continuous period of not less than 10
years prior to the dispossession in question. 188
186. Increasing the legitimacy of land arrangement is one of the objectives of South
African land policy. However inadequate settlements may be, compared to the injustices
of the past, it is essential that they are perceived as the most equitable that can be achieved
in the circumstances.
187. South Africa cannot honor the prevailing system of land ownership at the time of
expropriation. For instance, if land was taken from a Zulu tribe after 1913, then each
member of the tribe will receive their pro rata share of the resources allocated. The chief is
stripped of his traditional control over land. Contrary to the system of land ownership
existing at the time of expropriation, the chief and the single mother are placed on an
equal plane. While this is not in line with tradition, leveling the playing field is essential for
rectifying property-induced invisibility. When land is taken as part of a larger strategy of
dehumanization, the re-humanization process cannot recreate hierarchies that undermine
equality.
188. Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994 ch. I § 1(xi). It is important to note that
the racial discrimination must have had a "direct divestitive effect," and thus the focus is
on the "re-vesting of a right lost," rather than redistribution based on need. See M.D.
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The LRP received broad political support because it benefits the pre-1913
Black elite who owned land, as well as those of humble means with mere
occupancy rights. 189
The LRP, however, does not place limits on how much an individual or
community can claim, so it is possible for a member of the past Black
elite to receive R2,000,000, while a former labour tenant receives R200.
Insofar as the LRP perpetuates these glaring inequalities, the process and
result are less likely to be viewed as legitimate. In order to reduce ine-
qualities, it is advisable for South Africa to provide full compensation up
to a certain amount, partial compensation for amounts above this, and an
upper limit on the amount of compensation people can receive. 190 In or-
der to mitigate inequality, the Hungarian government followed a similar
path in their reparations program. 191 They compensated in full up to
HUF 200,000 ($2,300), and the remainder was compensated on a sliding
scale, but compensation could not exceed HUF 5,000,000 ($57,600) per
piece of property and per former owner. 192
It would not be fair, however, for the past Black elite to receive less
than the full market value for land expropriated pre-1994, while present
landowners (mostly white) receive full compensation if their land is ex-
propriated through the state's power of eminent domain post-1994. The
weight of reducing inequality must be borne by both the past Black elite,
as well as the present white elite. Section 25 of the Constitution takes this
into account by making the fair market value applicable to post-1994 ex-
propriations only the starting point for just compensation calculations.1 93
The award can be adjusted depending upon the following equitable fac-
tors: "the current use of the property; the history of the acquisition and
use of the property; the market value of the property; the extent of direct
SOUTHWOOD, THE COMPULSORY ACQUISITION OF RIGHTS BY EXPROPRIATION, WAYS OF
NECESSITY, PRESCRIPTION, LABOUR TENANCY AND RESTORATION 234, 247 (2000). The
right in land "may have been established by occupation of the land for a substantial period.
It is not limited to a right recognised by law. It is not limited to ownership rights, and it
may include certain long-term tenancy rights and other occupational rights." WHITE PA-
PER, supra note 132 § 4.14.2.
189. Deborah James et al., (Re)constituting Class?: Owners, Tenants and the Politics of
Land Reform in Mpumalanga 31 J. S. AFR. STUDIES 825, 841 (2005) (There is "a recogni-
tion, among those owners who have derived financial benefit from 'selling' land, that the
restitution process, although beneficial only to a few, had been undertaken with the electo-
ral backing of the broader population: 'We got this land back through other people's
votes"'); see also Walker, supra note 111, at 647 ("The restitution of land rights act was the
first piece of transformative legislation to be passed-amid a standing ovation-by South
Africa's newly democratized Parliament in November 1994.").
190. The threshold should vary depending upon whether the claim is urban/rural or a
group/individual claim.
191. Hungary's scheme provides partial compensation in the form of vouchers. See
Cheryl W. Gray, Rebecca J. Hanson & Michael Heller, Hungarian Legal Reform for the
Private Sector, 26 GEO. WASH. J. INTL. L. & ECON. 294, 309 (1992); Michael Heller &
Christopher Serkin, Private Law: Revaluing Restitution: From the Talmud to Postsocialism,
97 MICH. L. REV. 1385, 1402 (1999); Neff, supra note 94, at 373-75 (1992).
192. Gray, Hanson & Heller, supra note 191, at 309; Heller & Serkin, supra note 191, at
1402; Neff, supra note 94, at 374.
193. Supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text.
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state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital im-
provement of the property; the purpose of the expropriation.' 1 94 The
present landowning white population must help shoulder the burden of
legitimizing property rights alongside the past Black elite.
3. How Should the Process Unfold?
Invisibility was caused in many ways. Many people were routinely dis-
possessed of land, subjected to the cruelest forms of torture, deprived of
employment and educational opportunities, and denied the most basic
human freedoms. That is why it is crucial that the LRP is part of a larger
restorative process that includes the Truth and Reconciliation Commis-
sion, 19 5 as well as general redistributive measures through the housing,
education, social security, and health sectors. The end of Apartheid be-
gan the process of political inclusion, while restoration can do a signifi-
cant amount of work towards basic economic inclusion. 196
a. Transparency and Rule of Law are Crucial
Racist land laws served as the foundation upon which the Apartheid
state was constructed and hence, reversing the effects of these laws is an
essential element in the present, ongoing deconstruction of that white su-
premacist state. An important part of the deconstructionist project is the
property clause of the Constitution. 197 That clause takes into account the
194. Id.
195. See generally CHARLES VILLA-VICENCIO & WILHELM VERWOERD, LOOKING
BACK REACHING FORWARD: REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COM-
MISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA (2000); RICHARD A. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA: LEGITIMIZING THE POST-APARTHEID STATE (2001).
See also Theunis Roux, Land Restitution and Reconciliation (Nov. 2006), available at http://
www.saifac.org.za/docs/2006/Land %zoRestitution %20and%20Reconciliation%20in%20
South %zsAfrica-dftz.pdf (suggesting that the Truth and Reconciliation process should
have dovetailed with the LRP).
196. American blacks are a minority and are politically and economically marginalized.
In contrast, Blacks in South Africa are the majority and hence, politically empowered, but
economically marginalized. Reversing invisibility in South Africa must focus on economic
inclusion, where a two-prong approach may be more appropriate for American blacks.
197. See S. AF. CONST. 1996 BILL OF RIGHTS § 25 ("No one may be deprived of prop-
erty except in terms of law of general application, and no law may permit arbitrary depri-
vation of property. 2. Property may be expropriated only in terms of law of general
application: a. for a public purpose or in the public interest; and b. subject to compensa-
tion, the amount of which and the time and manner of payment of which have either been
agreed to by those affected or decided or approved by a court. 3. The amount of the
compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and equitable, reflecting
an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected, having
regard to all relevant circumstances, including; a. the current use of the property; b. the
history of the acquisition and use of the property; c. the market value of the property; d.
the extent of direct state investment and subsidy in the acquisition and beneficial capital
improvement of the property; and e. the purpose of the expropriation. 4. For the purposes
of this section; a. the public interest includes the nation's commitment to land reform, and
to reforms to bring about equitable access to all South Africa's natural resources; and b.
property is not limited to land. 5. The state must take reasonable legislative and other
measures, within its available resources, to foster conditions which enable citizens to gain
access to land on an equitable basis. 6. A person or community whose tenure of land is
legally insecure as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the
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pervasive property theft that occurred in South Africa's tumultuous past,
while setting the stage for a future where equality and dignity are para-
mount. The LRP is transparent and comports with the Constitution. In
fact, although the Constitution allows expropriation, LRP officials are
taking an extremely cautious approach and have for the most part relied
on a market-driven willing seller/willing buyer approach. The govern-
ment did not initiate its first formal proceeding to expropriate white
farms until 2007.198
So long as the state continues to operate within the Constitution's pa-
rameters and pays just compensation for expropriated properties, its ef-
forts to rectify property-induced invisibility will not lead to more
property-induced invisibility. Its efforts may cause less severe harms,
such as emotional distress, inconvenience, and lack of compensation for
the non-market value people place on property, but restructuring the
property status quo in order to legitimize it is not a costless, frictionless
process.
Nevertheless, it is crucial that all members of society view the process
as fair. Whites, who are the gatekeepers of capital in South Africa, will
likely close the gate if the process is viewed as unfair. Also, if LRP bene-
ficiaries feel like both the process and result were fair, then it is more
likely that the LRP will edify invisible people's relationships to society.199
b. Providing Asset-Based Choices Is Critical
I have argued that a transfer of assets within a paradigm of choice is
required to bring invisible people into the social contract. In theory,
under the LRP, a dispossessed claimant can be compensated with a vari-
ety of asset-based choices. The options include:
restoration of the land from which claimants were dispossessed; pro-
vision of alternative land; payment of compensation; alternative re-
lief including a package containing a combination of the above,
sharing of the land, or special budgetary assistance such as services
and infrastructure development where claimants presently live; or
extent provided by an Act of Parliament, either to tenure which is legally secure or to
comparable redress. 7. A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June
1913 as a result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent
provided by an Act of Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equitable
redress. 8. No provision of this section may impede the state from taking legislative and
other measures to achieve land, water and related reform, in order to redress the results of
past racial discrimination, provided that any departure from the provisions of this section is
in accordance with the provisions of section 36(1). 9. Parliament must enact the legislation
referred to in subsection (6).").
198. Michael Wines, South Africa to Seize 2 White Owned Farms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10,
2006, at A13; First White Owned Farms Expropriated, Feb. 14, 2007, http://iafrica.com/
news/sa/628569.htm.
199. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 162 (1990) (arguing that the norma-
tive rather than instrumentalist perspective better captures why people obey the law: From
the normative perspective "people react to social experiences in terms of the fairness of the
outcomes they receive (distributive justice), and the fairness of the procedures by which
those outcomes are arrived at (procedural justice).")
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priority access to state resources in the allocation and the develop-
ment of housing and land in the appropriate development
programme.200
South Africa is unique because, at least in theory, it has embraced the
importance of a bottom-up approach that focuses on asset-based choices
in addressing past land dispossession. The White Paper on Land Policy,
which is the government's definitive policy on land matters, states that
"solutions must not be forced on people. 201 As a result, the country has
the potential to move beyond a paradigm that focuses merely on repara-
tions to a new emphasis on restoring people's relationships to society.
Choice is particularly important with respect to the return of land, as
opposed to other forms of property. For example, one cannot assume
that people necessarily want to return to the land that was stolen from
them, especially when there has been a significant passage of time be-
tween the expropriation and the restorative act. If agricultural land was
confiscated, people may no longer have the skills, capital, or desire to
work the land as they once had. Instead, they may prefer to establish
themselves in the city in order to access the wealth, opportunities, and
social infrastructure found therein. Alternatively, the passage of time
may have attenuated ties to the community where the property is situ-
ated, or individuals may not want to return to the land because a series of
harrowing events that culminated in the expropriation make the land a
constant reminder of the trauma and pain suffered. Similarly, it is also
not fair to assume that people do not want to return to the land. Many
people have an unquantifiable but reasonable attachment to a particular
piece of land. The land may be where their ancestors are buried, it can be
a constitutive element of their cultural identity, or it can be infused with
valid emotive significance of various other origins.
Unfortunately, despite the mandate of the White Paper, in practice, the
role of choice is muted to a large extent, and those who have been dispos-
sessed are not given the full array of asset-based choices.202 Individual
claims have mostly been levied against urban land, where the govern-
ment's preference (and the most common form of compensation) is mon-
etary compensation. 20 3 The experience of former Sophiatown residents,
which is the site of one of the most infamous Apartheid-era urban evic-
tions, is telling. Nkuzi, a well-regarded land-sector NGO noted that,
"[w]hile the validity of their claims was undeniable the government de-
cided that 'restoration of land was not feasible . . .and alternative land
within the same magisterial districts was not available'. . . and therefore
they offered only financial compensation to the claimants. .. 204 It is
clear from Nkuzi's accounts that there was no room for creative, people-
200. See WHITE 'PAPER, supra note 132 § 4.14.4.
201. Id. § 4.14.1.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Walker, supra note 111, at 662.
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driven remedies as contemplated in the White Paper, because the only
options contemplated were return of the land, alternative land, or finan-
cial compensation. 20 5 There were no innovative in-kind options offered,
such as access to highly subsidized credit, free vocational training, or any
other options claimants may have desired.2 0 6
Group claims are largely made against rural lands, where the govern-
ment's preference (and incidentally, the common outcome) is to give the
group their land back.20 7 For all group claims, the Commission on Resti-
tution of Land Rights holds a general meeting that all beneficiaries are
invited to attend.20 8 Ostensibly, the advantages and disadvantages of all
options are discussed and eventually a remedy is chosen by majority vote.
But it is unclear to what extent the government's preferences color these
meetings or which options are discussed. What is clear is that people-
driven, in-kind options are not seriously on the table.
Despite the political mandate articulated in the White Paper and the
fact that approximately 68,000 claims have already been decided,20 9 there
have only been a few instances where people were given the opportunity
to craft bottom-up, self-styled restoration packages. This is what led Tozi
Gwanya, Chief Land Claims Commissioner, to admit that "the White Pa-
per provides for options but as officiants, we have been unable to make it
a reality.12 1 0 The problem is that providing creative choices takes time,
but time is short.2 1 ' The Commission on Restitution of Land Rights was
given until March 31, 2008 to finish its job.2 12
There have been a few rural examples of self-styled remedies where
beneficiaries were allowed to exercise their agency.2 13 A community in
Putfontein, which is located in the Guateng region, leveraged their
money to construct a housing development. 2 4 A community in Queen-
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Didiza, supra note 138.
208. Id.
209. See Interview with Tozi Gwanya, supra note 112.
210. Id. See also Interview with Blessing Mphela, Land Claims Commissioner for
Guateng and North West, in Pretoria, S. Afr. (Jan. 11, 2006) (expressing the view on the
matter that "issues around remedies were not well thought out").
211. In general, in order to allow for creative asset-based choices, restoration programs
require a sophisticated, efficient, and non-corrupt bureaucracy. The problem is that transi-
tional or developing governments who most need restoration programs often do not have
developed bureaucracies or suffer from high rates of corruption. See generally, SHAUKAT
ALl, CORRUPTION: A THIRD WORLD PERSPECTIVE (1985); DAVID J. GOULD, BUREAU-
CRATIC CORRUPTION AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN THE THIRD WORLD: THE CASE OF
ZAIRE (1980); STEPHEN KOTKIN & ANDRAS SAJO, POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN TRANSI-
TION: A SKEPTICS HANDBOOK (2002).
212. Walker, supra note 111, at 648.
213. One critique proffered by an opposition party is that restoration monies are being
used to provide services that the government is suppose to provide anyway. However,
many of the projects the communities are pursuing were not the local government's prior-
ity list. By using restoration monies, communities are able to make their priorities come to
fruition because they are able to leverage their monies to receive additional monies from
the government. Interview with Tozi Gwanya, supra note 112.
214. Id.
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stown, which is located in the Eastern Cape, received half of their award
in money paid to eligible households, while the other half was used for
three development projects that would benefit all members of the com-
munity-a community center, an old-age home, and an indoor sports
center. 21 5 Finally, a community in Keiskanmahoek also split the funds:
Half of the money was received in financial compensation, while the
other half was invested in community development projects, which in-
cluded building three extra classrooms in the local school, repairing the
central road, and creating a forestry project to expand the forest.216
In urban areas, there are also a few instances where people were able
to take an active role in shaping their remedy. District Six, in Cape Town,
is the most acclaimed example, but communities in Port Elizabeth, East
London, and Durban have been successful at moving beyond the cookie-
cutter remedies presented by the government to remedies that are largely
self-styled housing developments.217
South Africa must transform the LRP, which at present functions as a
reparations program, into a restoration program. The state must en-
courage communities and individuals to exercise their volition as they did
in the few rural and urban communities discussed above, because ulti-
mately, the provision of asset-based choices is how the larger project of
restoring a community or individual's relationship to society will be ac-
complished. This type of creative, humanizing approach that places dis-
possessed individuals in control of their own lives and communities will
go a long way toward reintegrating people back into the social contract,
thereby ameliorating property-induced invisibility.
When the full array of choices is not on the table, then the conse-
quences can be dire. For example, the Khomani San were given limited
options-return of their land or cash compensation. 218 They chose return
of their land, but today, the settlement is in shambles, partly due to lack
of post-settlement support.219 This could have been avoided if the
Khomani San were given a more robust set of options. They could have,
for example, reduced the acreage received in exchange for various types
of government-guaranteed post-settlement support. The key is for the
government to provide a space in which beneficiaries are heavily en-
couraged to look beyond the narrow options presented, take charge, and,
within the bounds of resources available, create a remedy that satiates
their idiosyncratic needs.
215. The Department of Social Development and the local municipality contributed to
the development projects. Id.
216. Id.
217. Walker, supra note 111, at 658.





My analysis begins at the point that a state has already decided to com-
pensate people for past dispossession. The two pertinent questions this
Article addressed were: Who should benefit?, and How should the pro-
cess unfold? I have argued that, as a baseline, those subject to property-
induced invisibility must be restored. Property-induced invisibility results
when property is confiscated, such that a person or community is re-
moved from the social contract.
In terms of how the process should unfold, I have argued that states
must move beyond mere reparations (compensation without choice) to
restoration (compensation with choice). Restoration is superior to repa-
rations because it entails the larger, more complex task of restoring an
invisible person's or community's relationship to society. The reintegra-
tion process of dispossessed individuals and communities is facilitated
when they are allowed to choose how they are compensated and given
viable asset-based options to choose from. By rejecting the dominant
paradigm of reparation and adopting a policy of restoration, a country
can move beyond restoring property rights to restoring political and eco-
nomic visibility.
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